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### 1

#### the affirmative’s insistence on US led economic cooperation and integration reifies neoliberalism’s hegemonic grasp in Latin America – the impact is extinction – neoliberalism reduces existence itself to property to be exchanged - that causes massive structural violence and environmental destruction – the alternative is to vote negative to reject neoliberal knowledge production - de-linking from Latin America allows movements against neoliberalism to effectively manifest themselves

HARRIS 8 (Richard L Harris: Professor of Global Studies at California State University, Monterey Bay; Managing Editor of the Journal of Developing Societies (SAGE India); and Coordi­nating Editor of Latin American Perspectives (SAGE USA). “Latin America’s Response to Neoliberalism and Globalization,” http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3506\_2.pdf)

The economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean countries is obstructed by the power relations and international structures that regulate the world capitalist system. The structures of this system provide a hierarchical political and economic exoskeleton that constrains all national efforts to pursue any significant degree of self-directed, inward-oriented, balanced and environmentally sustainable development. Indeed, the geopolitical power structures that preserve and support the world capitalist system have made it almost impossible for the governments of the core as well as the peripheral countries in this system to pursue a path of inward-oriented, equitable, democratically controlled and environmentally sustainable development (Amin 2001b:20). Since the 1980s, inter-American relations and the economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean states have been shaped by these geo­ political structures and the neoliberal strategic agenda put forward by the government of the United States of America (USA), the major transnational corporations and the three major international financial institutions (IFIs) that operate in the Latin American and Caribbean region (Harris and Nef, 2008). This later group of IFIs includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The policies of these IFIs based in Washington generally follow the dictates of the government of the USA due to the controlling influence that it exercises over these institutions. Their agenda for the Latin American and Caribbean region gives priority to promoting and protecting the interests of the major investors and transnational corporations that are largely based in the USA and operate in the region. It also serves to maintain and strengthen the geopolitical hegemony of the USA over the Western Hemisphere (Harris and Nef). But conditions are changing. Washington’s neoliberal agenda for controlling the capi­ talist development of the Western Hemisphere and maintaining US hegemony over the region is increasingly threatened by a progressive alternative agenda for the regio­ nal integration of the Latin American and Caribbean countries that has begun to gain widespread support in the region. This alternative agenda for the region calls for the autonomous economic development of the region free of the hegemonic control and influence of the USA and the IFIs based in Washington. Not only does this type of development pose a fundamental threat to the hegemony of the USA in the region, it threatens the dominance of transnational capital throughout the Americas. Moreover, it also poses a significant threat to the global expansion and integration of the world capitalist system in general and to the global hegemonic coalition led by the government and transnational corporations of the USA. Today, political and economic strategies are being developed for moving from the prevailing export-oriented neoliberal model of economic development to new in­ ward-oriented models of sustainable development, tailored to the diverse conditions, economic capacities, political structures, natural endowments and cultural values of the societies involved. Moreover, a growing number of international and regional civil society organizations have emerged in recent years to create such alternatives. What the forums, networks, programs, and activities of these various types of organizations reveal is that there is a growing international network of organizations and social movements committed to promoting new, more equitable forms of international cooperation and regulation that support inward-oriented and sustainable development as well as genuine democracy at the regional and national levels. At the same time, these organizations argue that the present global trading regime that has been erected under the WTO should and can be replaced by a new global trading system that replaces the present system of so-called free but in fact unfair trade, with a sys­ tem that ensures «fair trade» and promotes South-South economic exchange and coo­ peration. Most of the progressive alternatives advocated by these organizations and the new left-leaning governments that have been elected to office in the region give priority to aligning the external relations of the countries in the region to the internal needs of the majority of the population. That is to say, decisions about what to export and what to import should be aligned with the needs of the population rather than the interests of transnational capitalists and transnational corporations or the hegemonic interests of the USA. Some of these alternative strategies involve what Walden Bello (2002) has referred to as «deglobalization.» That is to say, they involve unlinking the economies of these peripheral capitalist societies from the advanced capitalist centers of the world economy, particularly in the USA. They also involve throwing off the constraints that have been imposed upon the economic policies and structures of the­ se countries by the IFIs (IMF, World Bank, and IDB), the WTO and the other agents and regulatory regimes that regulate the world capitalist system. In fact, there appears to be growing interest throughout Latin America in revivifying the Pan-American ideal of unification, currently perhaps best expressed in Hugo Chávez’ Bolivarian dream of turning South America into a regional economic hegemon (DeLong, 2005). The governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay have indicated they want to join the government of Venezuela in creating a regional union. It has been proposed that this coalescing continental confederation should shift the region’s extra-continental trade towards Europe, Asia and South Africa and away from North America. The prospect of this happening appears to have alarmed Washington more than the increasing number of electoral triumphs of leftist politicians in the region (Delong). There has also been considerable talk in the region about creating a single currency for the South American countries that would be modeled on and perhaps tied to the Euro rather than the US Dollar. This discussion is symptomatic of what appears to be an emerging desire to create an integrated economic and political community that is strikingly different from the type of hemispheric economic integration scheme being pursued by the Washington and its allies in the region (DeLong). Moreover, there is an increasing tendency in the region to find alternatives to trading with the USA. In particular, several Latin American nations (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile) have been strengthening their economic relations with Asia, particularly with China. But the widespread popular opposition to neoliberalism and so-called globalization, and the shift to the Left in the region’s politics, represent much more than a serious challenge to US hegemony, they also represent a serious threat to the existing pattern of capitalist development in the region. Central to Washington’s strategy for the hemisphere has been the imposition of a neoliberal model of capitalist development on the region which involves the increasing integration of the region’s economies into a hemispheric ‘free trade’ area or rather a trade bloc that is dominated by the USA. This project is itself an essential part of the strategy of the USA for the domination of the global economy by its transnational corporations. The restructuring of the economies of the region under the mantra of neoliberalism and the banner of globalization has been aimed at giving the USA-based transnational corporations and investors free reign within the region and a strong hemispheric base from which to dominate the world economy In opposition to the neoliberal, polyarchical and globalizing model of development that has been imposed by the government of the USA and its allies in the region, the growing movement for an alternative form of development that is both genuinely democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable appears to be gaining ground in various parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. This alternative model of development requires the reorganization and realignment of the existing economies in the region. It also requires the replacement of the existing political regimes, which serve the interests of the transnational bloc of social forces that are behind the integration of the region into the new global circuits of accumulation and production that the major trans­ national corporations and the IFIs have been constructing since the 1970s. In addition to fundamental economic changes, most of the existing pseudo-democratic political regimes in the region need to be thoroughly democratized so that they are responsive to and capable of serving the needs and interests of the majority of the people rather than the ruling polyarchies and the transnational corporations operating in the region. An essential requirement for realigning the region’s economies so that they produce people-centered and environmentally sustainable development is the integration of these economies into a regional economic and political union that has the resources, structures and the power to operate independently of the government of the USA and the transnational corporations based in the USA as well as in the European Union and Japan. If this type of regional integration takes place, it will enable the Latin American and Caribbean states to break free of the hegemonic influence of the USA, and reverse the denationalization (‘globalization’) of the Latin American and Caribbean economies. Instead of the corporate-driven hemispheric integration of the region under the hegemony of the USA, a new system of regional economic cooperation and both equitable as well as environmentally sustainable development is desperately needed to improve the lives of the vast majority of the people living in Latin America and the Caribbean. This type of regional, equitable and sustainable development can only be success­ fully carried out by truly democratically elected political leaders with broad-based popular support who are sincerely committed to achieving this alternative rather than the elitist neoliberal model. It probably will also require democratic socialist political institutions and structures of production and distribution. Regionalism has been the dream of the democratic left for some time. The European Union has its origins in the French socialist dream of ending Franco-German enmity through unifying Europe, and African regionalism was the vision of African socialists such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who saw regional integration as the only means to progress beyond tribalism and colonialism and create a united and democratic Africa (Faux, 2001:4). Viewed from the perspective of those who want to create a people-cen­ tered, democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable social order in the Ame­ ricas, the corporate-dominated process of capitalist pseudo-globalization taking place in the region and around the world urgently needs to be replaced by what Samir Amin has referred to as a new system of «pluricentric regulated globalization» (Amin, 2001a). This alternative form of globalization requires the development of regional economic and political unions in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and elsewhere, which collaboratively promote people-centered, democratic and envi­ ronmentally sustainable forms of development on a regional basis. According to Amin, these regional unions of states are needed to collaborate as partners in collecti­ vely regulating the global restructuring of the world economy for the benefit of the vast majority of humanity rather than the transnational corporations and the northern centers of the world capitalist system in the USA, Europe and Japan. This type of regional-based regulative order is needed to regulate and redirect inter­ national economic, social, and political relations so that these relations serve the inte­ rests and needs of the vast majority of the world’s population. The present power structures and regulatory regime of the world capitalist system support the transna­ tional corporate-driven restructuring and denationalization of the economies of both the societies at the core and in the periphery of this system. The Latin American and Caribbean countries need to ‘de-link’ step-by-step from this exploitative and inequitable system. They need to redirect and restructure their eco­ nomies so that they serve the needs of the majority of their people while also protec­ ting their natural resources and ecosystems. The alternative policies of economic, poli­ tical and social development proposed and in some cases adopted by the new leftist leaders, the progressive civil society organizations and their supporters, combined with the project of regional integration associated with the new Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), are significant indications of unprecedented and pro­ found transformation unfolding in the Americas. A growing number of civil society organizations and social movements throughout the Americas are pressuring the governments of the region to follow what the pro­ gressive civil society networks such as the Alianza Social Continental/ Hemispheric Social Alliance (ASC/HSA) describes as a regional model of integration that supports the environmentally sustainable and democratic development of all the societies in the region (see ASC-HSA, 2006). The ASC/HSA also contends that the UNASUR pro­ ject and the Bolivarian dream of unification is threatened by the so-called free trade agreements that Washington has negotiated with Chile, Colombia, Peru, the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. As the ASC/HSA makes clear in its documents and public information campaigns, these agreements compromise the national sovereignty, obstruct the local production of medicines, threaten public health, facilitate the profit-driven privatization of water and vital services such as health and sanitation, and threaten the survival of indigenous cultures, biodiversity, food sovereignty, and local control over natural resources. The «Alternatives for the Americas» proposal developed by this inter-American network of progressive civil society organizations and social movements calls on all governments in the region to subordinate trade and investments to sustainability and environmental protection as well as social justice and local democratic control over economic and social development (ASC/HSA 2002:5). The growing number and political influence of these kinds of networks, organizations and movements provide unquestionable evidence of the emergence of the social for­ ces and political conditions that Panitch (1996:89) and others (Harris, 1995:301-302; Jo­ nas and McCaughan, 1994) predicted in the 1990s would arise in opposition to neoli­ beralism, corporate-dominated pseudo globalization and the extension and consolida­ tion of the hegemony of the USA. It now seems increasingly possible that these forces and the political mobilization that they have helped to create will transform the politi­ cal regimes in the region as well as the nature of inter-American relations, bring about the regional integration of the Latin American countries and free these countries from US hegemony and the form of ‘turbo-capitalism’ to which they have been subjected. At this point, we can only speak in general terms about the new model(s) of develop­ ment that will replace the neoliberal model of uneven and inequitable development that has pillaged most of the region.

### 2

#### Democracy’s backsliding now

Diamond ‘9

[Larry Diamond 2009, Professor of Political Science and Sociology @ Stanford, “The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Democracy”, Presented to the SAIS-CGD Conference on New Ideas in Development after the Financial Crisis, Conference Paper that can be found on his Vita]

Concern about the future of democracy is further warranted by the gathering signs of a democratic recession, even before the onset of the global economic recession. During the past decade, the global expansion of democracy has essentially leveled off and hit an equilibrium While freedom (political rights and civil liberties) continued to expand throughout the post-Cold War era, that progress also halted in 2006, and 2007 and 2008 were the worst consecutive years for freedom since the end of the Cold War, with the number of countries declining in freedom greatly outstripping the number that improved. Two-thirds of all the breakdowns of democracy since the third wave began in 1974 have occurred in the last nine years, and in a number of strategically important states like Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Pakistan and Thailand. Many of these countries have not really returned to democracy. And a number of countries linger in a twilight zone between democracy and authoritarianism. While normative support for democracy has grown around the world, it remains in many countries, tentative and uneven, or is even eroding under the weight of growing public cynicism about corruption and the self-interested behavior of parties and politicians. Only about half of the public, on average, in Africa and Asia meets a rigorous, multidimensional test of support for democracy. Levels of distrust for political institutions—particularly political parties and legislatures, and politicians in general—are very high in Eastern Europe and Latin America, and in parts of Asia. In many countries, 30-50 percent of the public or more is willing to consider some authoritarian alternative to democracy, such as military or one-man rule. And where governance is bad or elections are rigged and the public cannot rotate leaders out of power, skepticism and defection from democracy grow. Of the roughly 80 new democracies that have emerged during the third wave and are still standing, probably close to three-quarters are insecure and could run some risk of reversal during adverse global and domestic circumstances. Less at risk—and probably mostly consolidated—are the more established developing country democracies (India, Costa Rica, Botswana, Mauritius), and the more liberal democracies of this group: the ten postcommunist states that have been admitted to the EU; Korea and Taiwan; Chile, Uruguay, Panama, Brazil, probably Argentina; a number of liberal island states in the Caribbean and Pacific. This leaves about 50 democracies and near democracies—including such big and strategically important states as Turkey, Ukraine, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, certainly Pakistan and Bangladesh, and possibly even Mexico—where the survival of constitutional rule cannot be taken for granted. In some of these countries, like South Africa, the demise of democracy would probably come, if it happened, not as a result of a blatant overthrow of the current system, but rather via a gradual executive strangling of political pluralism and freedom, or a steady decline in state capacity and political order due to rising criminal and ethnic violence. Such circumstances would also swallow whatever hopes exist for the emergence of genuine democracy in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan and for the effective restoration of democracy in countries like Thailand and Nepal.

**Meachem says the aff solves relations – “Just as NAFTA transformed the relationship between the United States and Mexico, a TTIP could do the same for transatlantic relations”**

#### Solves democracy

O’Neil ‘13

[Shannon. Senior Fellow for Latin American Studies at CFR. PhD in Govt from Harvard. “Mexico at Crossroads.” 2013 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDUQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fattachments%2FONeil_Two_Nations_Indivisible_Ch1.pdf&ei=F_lvUqelHobuyAHFioHABw&usg=AFQjCNHiGrYT3eoEtZbs2FX0TvgIoxeQfQ&sig2=GfJpSPFHudgKJtRLstOOOQ//GBS-JV>]

Diplomatically, we also need to rethink the United States’ approach in¶ light of Mexico’s ongoing political transformation. A stronger partnership¶ provides the best platform for a prominent U.S. twenty-first century foreign¶ policy priority: democracy promotion. Despite frequent misunderstandings¶ our long shared history, intertwined economies, and strong personal¶ and community links provide the constant multilayered interaction necessary¶ to work together toward the complex goal of strengthening democracy.¶ Joint economic development initiatives, support for local citizen organizations,¶ and eff orts to increase transparency and strengthen courts and police¶ forces will all benefi t from the strong links that already exist between our¶ two nations.¶ Mexico, not the Middle East, should be the test case for solidifying¶ market-based democracy. It is not only much more likely to succeed, but also arguably much more likely to hurt the United States if it fails. Mexico’s¶ success is more probable because it has already taken many tough steps, all¶ on its own. Aft er seventy years of one-party rule, Mexicans used their votes¶ to usher in an opposition party president. Abandoning a long history of¶ ballot-box stuffi ng, Mexico’s parties now compete in quite clean and transparent¶ elections. Th e country’s over 100 million citizens dream of—and are¶ already working hard to create—a vibrant and prosperous political system¶ where their voices can be heard and their hard work rewarded. If successful,¶ Mexico would provide a positive example of a newly consolidated democracy,¶ off ering lessons for others worldwide.¶ Nevertheless, it still faces considerable challenges. Many in fact worry¶ that Mexico’s democratic gains may be lost, overcome by political bosses,¶ special interests, and drug-related violence. And Mexico’s failure would lead¶ to disastrous consequences for U.S. foreign policy, not to mention America’s¶ economic, political, and social well-being at home. The United States’ focus¶ elsewhere—particularly in Asia and the Middle East—has distracted us¶ from the game-changing importance of political choices being made just¶ next door.

#### autocratic peace theory’s a better explanation for stability

Gartzke and Weisiger ‘13

[Erik Gartzke, University of California, and Alex Weisiger 2013, University of Pennsylvania. “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace” http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke\_weisiger\_isq\_2013.pdf]

The “autocratic peace” involves a class of arguments¶ about the conflictual consequences of regime similarity¶ and difference. Theories disagree over whether demo-¶ cratic and autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent.¶ Early studies of the autocratic peace typically focused on¶ certain geographic regions. Despite having little democ-¶ racy, low levels of economic development, arbitrary¶ national borders, and widespread civil conflict, Africa¶ experiences surprisingly little interstate war. Several stud-¶ ies attribute the “African peace” to historical norms and¶ to the strategic behavior of insecure leaders who recog-¶ nize that challenging existing borders invites continental¶ war while encouraging secessionist movements risks reci-¶ procal meddling in the country’s own domestic affairs¶ (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990).¶ 6¶ How-¶ ever, these arguments fail to address tensions between¶ individual (state, leader) interests and social goods. The¶ security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggres-¶ sively despite lacking revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978).¶ Initial statistical evidence of an autocratic peace¶ emerged in a negative form with the observation that¶ mixed democratic¶ –¶ autocratic dyads are more conflict¶ prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic¶ dyads (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre¶ 1997). Studies have sought systematic evidence for or¶ against an autocratic peace. Oren and Hays (1997) evalu-¶ ate several data sets, finding that autocracies are less war¶ prone than democracy¶ –¶ autocracy pairs. Indeed, they find¶ that socialist countries with advanced industrialized econ-¶ omies are more peaceful than democracies. Werner¶ (2000) finds an effect of political similarity that coexists¶ with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She¶ attributes the result to shared preferences arising from a¶ reduced likelihood of disputes over domestic politics.¶ Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the¶ broad category of autocracy into multiple subgroups and¶ find evidence that shared autocratic type (personalistic¶ dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas)¶ reduces conflict, although the observed effects are less¶ pronounced than for joint democracy. Henderson (2002)¶ goes further by arguing that there is no empirically verifi able democratic peace. Instead, political dissimilarity¶ causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that simi-¶ larity of both political and economic institutions encour-¶ ages peace. In the most sophisticated analysis to date,¶ Bennett (2006) finds a robust autocratic peace, though¶ the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited¶ to coherent autocratic regimes. Petersen (2004), in con-¶ trast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and¶ finds no support for the claim that similarity prevents or¶ limits conflict. Still, the bulk of evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, even¶ among nondemocracies.¶ The autocratic peace poses unique challenges for demo-¶ cratic peace theories. Given that the democratic peace¶ highlights apparently unique characteristics of joint¶ democracy, many explanations are predicated on attributes¶ found only in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace¶ implies that scholars should focus on corollaries or conse-¶ quences of shared regime type, in addition to, or perhaps¶ even instead of democracy. In this context, arguments¶ about democratic norms (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon¶ 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994;¶ Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed¶ on leaders by democratic institutions (Bueno de Mesquita¶ et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman¶ 2001a) all invite additional scrutiny. While it is theoretically¶ possible that a democratic peace and an autocratic peace¶ could arise from independent causal processes, logical ele-¶ gance and the empirical similarities inherent in shared¶ regime type provide cause to explore theoretical argu-¶ ments that spring from regime similarity in general.¶

#### Existential threat

Dasse ‘6

[Chris. Professor of International Relations at the University of Munich. “Democratic Wars Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace” p. 75 2006]

This hypothesis postulates a causal relationship between democratic community building, which draws on shared institutions, common values and security cooperation on the one hand, and democratic belligerence vis-à-vis non-democratic states on the other, which is based on non-recognition, exclusion and enmity. A process seems to be at work in international relations that works similarly to the mechanism Charles Tilly described as the state-building process in Europe, in which internal pacification was achieved through external war-making (Tilly, 1975a, 1985). In the international system of today, an analogous mechanism is contributing to democratic community building and the renunciation of violence through coalition warfare and collective conflict management (Cederman, 2001). That means that the very same reasons that generate peaceful relations among democracies also provoke democracies to wage war against non-democracies. If this is the case, it might be helpful to draw on explanations of democratic peace in order to generate hypotheses about ‘democratic war’ and to explain the war-proneness of democracies vis-à-vis nondemocratic states. Throughout this, it is important not to focus on the reasons for the use of force alone but also to look at the way in which military means are applied. For Alexis de Tocqueville observed that changing reasons for war also lead to changing forms of warfare. Therefore, to explain democratic war, Tocqueville seems to be more helpful than Kant. While Kant focuses on the singular decision to go to war, Tocqueville takes the processes into account by which democracies engage in military action. By doing so, he is able to analyse some of the dynamics that create the democratic war puzzle. In his famous book on ‘Democracy in America’ he summarized his findings: ‘There are two things which a democratic people will always find very difficult – to begin a war and to end it’ (Tocqueville, 1840, p. 393). In what follows, I will focus on three reasons why democracies might be peaceful to each other, but abrasive or even bellicose towards nondemocracies. The first reason is an institutional one: domestic institutions 76 Democratic Wars dampen conflicts among democracies but aggravate conflicts between democracies and non-democracies. The second reason is a normative one: shared social values and political ideals prevent wars between democracies but make wars between democracies and non-democracies more likely and savage. The third reason is a structural one: the search for safety encourages democracies to create security communities by renouncing violence among themselves but demands assertiveness against outsiders and the willingness to use military means if enlargement of that community cannot be achieved peacefully. To illustrate this, I will draw mainly on the United States as an example following a Tocquevillean tradition, but knowing that not all democracies behave in the same way or that the US is the only war-fighting democracy. It is clear that the hypotheses are first conjectures and that more case studies and quantitative tests are needed to reach more general conclusions

### 3

#### Immigration reform will pass—momentum

Sargent 10/30 – Greg Sargent is an opinions writer for the WaPo. He joined the Post in early 2009, after stints at Talking Points Memo, New York Magazine and the New York Observer. (“Immigration reform is definitely undead”, 10/30/2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/30/immigration-reform-is-definitely-undead/)

We now have three House Republicans who have signed on to the House Dem comprehensive immigration reform bill, **putting immigration reform officially back in the “undead” category**. GOP Rep. David Valadao of California is officially on board with the bipartisan proposal, according to a statement from the Congressman sent my way: “I have been working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to find common ground on the issue of immigration reform. Recently, I have focused my efforts on joining with likeminded Republicans in organizing and demonstrating to Republican Leadership broad support within the Party to address immigration reform in the House by the end of the year. “By supporting H.R. 15 I am strengthening my message: Addressing immigration reform in the House cannot wait. I am serious about making real progress and will remain committed to doing whatever it takes to repair our broken immigration system.” Valadao’s move is not wholly unexpected, given that he inhabits a moderate district with a lot of Latinos. But his insistence that addressing immigration reform “cannot wait” is helpful. It seems like an implicit message to the GOP leadership: We must act this year, and on this bill, if necessary. This comes after GOP Reps. leana Ros-Lehtinen and Jeff Denham Jeff Denham did the same. Denham has said he expects “more” Republicans to ultimately sign on, and has also said that the House GOP leadership told him there will be a vote on something immigration-related by the end of the year. It’s unclear whether there will actually be a House vote on anything involving immigration before the year runs out, and it seems very unlikely that there will be a vote on the House Dem measure, which is essentially the Senate comprehensive immigration reform bill, without the Corker-Hoeven border security amendment that House Dems dislike, and instead with another border security amendment House Dems like swapped in. However, the movement among Republicans towards the Dem bill — even if it is only a trickle for now — is interesting, as a reminder that immigration reform can happen if House GOP leaders actually want it to.

**Plan’s perceived as deprioritizing security, and looks soft on drugs – drains pc**

**Shear, 13**

(Michael, NYT White house correspondent, 5/5, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-from-drug-war-to-economy.html?pagewanted=all>)

Last week, Mr. Obama returned to capitals **in Latin America** with a vastly different message. **Relationships with countries racked by drug violence and organized crime should focus more on economic development** and less on the endless battles against drug traffickers and organized crime capos that have left few clear victors. The countries, Mexico in particular, need to set their own course on security, with the United States playing more of a backing role. **That approach runs the risk of being seen as kowtowing to governments more concerned about their public image than the underlying problems tarnishing it. Mexico,** which **is eager to play up its economic growth, has mounted an aggressive effort to play down its crime problems**, going as far as to encourage the news media to avoid certain slang words in reports. “The problem will not just go away,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue. “**It needs** to be tackled head-on, with a comprehensive **strategy** that includes but goes **beyond stimulating economic growth** and alleviating poverty. **“Obama becomes vulnerable to the charge of downplaying the region’s overriding issue**, **and the chief obstacle to economic progress**,” he added. “It is fine to change the narrative from security to economics as long as the reality on the ground reflects and fits with the new story line.” Administration officials insist that Mr. Obama remains cleareyed about the security challenges, but the new emphasis corresponds with a change in focus by the Mexican government. The new Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December vowing to reduce the violence that exploded under the militarized approach to the drug war adopted by his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. That effort left about 60,000 Mexicans dead and appears not to have significantly damaged the drug-trafficking industry. In addition to a focus on reducing violence, which **some critics have interpreted as taking a softer line on the drug gangs**, Mr. Peña Nieto has also moved to reduce American involvement in law enforcement south of the border. With friction and mistrust between American and Mexican law enforcement agencies growing, Mr. Obama suggested that **the U**nited **S**tates **would no longer seek to dominate the security agenda**. “It is obviously up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States,” he said, standing next to Mr. Peña Nieto on Thursday in Mexico City. “But the main point I made to the president is that we support the Mexican government’s focus on reducing violence, and we look forward to continuing our good cooperation in any way that the Mexican government deems appropriate.” In some ways, conceding leadership of the drug fight to Mexico hews to a guiding principle of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy, in which American supremacy is played down, at least publicly, in favor of a multilateral approach. But **that philosophy could collide with the concerns of lawmakers in Washington, who** have **expressed frustration with what they see as** a **lack of clarity in Mexico’s security plans**. And **security analysts say the entrenched corruption in Mexican law enforcement has long clouded the partnership** with their American counterparts. **Putting Mexico in the driver’s seat** on security **marks a shift in a balance of power** that has always tipped to the United States **and,** analysts said, **will carry political risk as Congress negotiates an immigration bill that is expected to include provisions for tighter border security.** “If there is a **perception in the U.S. Congress that security cooperation is weakening**, that **could play into the hands of those who oppose immigration reform,” said** Vanda Felbab-**Brown, a counternarcotics expert at** the **Brookings** Institution in Washington. “Realistically, the border is as tight as could be and there have been few spillovers of the violence from Mexico into the U.S.,” she added, but **perceptions count in Washington “and can be easily distorted**.” “**Drugs** today **are not very important to the U.S. public over all,”** she added, “**but they are important to committed drug warriors who are politically powerful.”** Representative Michael T. **McCaul**, a Texas Republican who is **chair**man **of the Homeland Security Committee, has warned against** the danger of **drug cartels** forming **alliances with terrorist groups**. “While these threats exist, you would be surprised to find that the administration thinks its work here is done,” he wrote in an opinion article for Roll Call last month, pressing for more border controls in the bill. The Obama administration has said any evidence of such cooperation is very thin, but even without terrorist connections, **drug gangs pose threats to** peace and **security. Human rights advocates said they feared the U**nited **States would ease pressure on Mexico** to investigate disappearances and other abuses at the hands of the police and military, who have received substantial American support. The shift in approach “suggests that the Obama administration either doesn’t object to these abusive practices or is only willing to raise such concerns when it’s politically convenient,” said José Miguel Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch’s Americas division. Still, administration officials have said there may have been an overemphasis on the bellicose language and high-profile hunts for cartel leaders while the real problem of lawlessness worsens. American antidrug aid is shifting more toward training police and shoring up judicial systems that have allowed criminals to kill with impunity in Mexico and Central America. United States officials said Mr. Obama remains well aware of the region’s problems with security, even as he is determined that they not overshadow the economic opportunities. It is clear Mr. Obama, whatever his words four years ago, now believes there has been too much security talk. In a speech to Mexican students on Friday, Mr. Obama urged people in the two countries to look beyond a one-dimensional focus on what he called real security concerns, saying it is “time for us to put the old mind-sets aside.” And he repeated the theme later in the day in Costa Rica, lamenting that **when it comes to the United States and Central America,** “so **much of the focus ends up being on security**.” “We also have to recognize that problems like narco-trafficking arise in part when a country is vulnerable because of poverty, because of institutions that are not working for the people, because young people don’t see a brighter future ahead,” Mr. Obama said in a news conference with Laura Chinchilla, the president of Costa Rica.

#### Political capital is key to get it through the House

Munro 10-24

[Neil. Politics for the Daily Caller. 10/24/13 <http://dailycaller.com/2013/10/24/obama-to-urge-immigration-increase-in-white-house-speech/#ixzz2ifJsBq9g> //GBS-JV]

Obama’s high-profile speech also reverses his long-standing effort to keep a low profile in the debate. The strategy was intended to help immigration-friendly Republicans, including Sen. Marco Rubio, Sen. Lindsey Graham and Rep. Paul Ryan, woo GOP legislators for the amnesty and doubled inflow. The plan helped the Democrats get a bill through the Senate in June. Obama is expected to couch his East Room call for greater immigration in poll-tested and vague language that masks the unpopular aspects of the proposed rewrite. On Oct. 17, for example, Obama said the bill “would make the biggest commitment to border security in our history; would modernize our legal immigration system; make sure everyone plays by the same rules, makes sure that folks who came here illegally have to pay a fine, pay back taxes, meet their responsibilities.” ¶ In practice, the Senate bill would double immigration via various programs, and provide a staged amnesty to 11 million illegal immigrants. Overall, it would ensure the arrival of 33 million immigrants over 10 years, and double the resident pool of low-wage, university trained guest-workers to roughly 2 million.

#### Visas are key to cybersecurity preparedness

McLarty 9 (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States.¶ We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the United States, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward.¶ MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen, I think, our system, our security needs.

#### Cyber-vulnerability causes great power nuclear war

Fritz 9 Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament [Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international relations at Bond University, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” July, <http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf>]

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.

### 4

#### The United States federal government should facilitate Canada’s entry into the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

#### Their evidence says that’s necessary and sufficient—either neither of us solve or we both do

**Hills 4/24/13** Chief Executive Officer of Hills & Company International Consultants, former U.S. Trade Representative, and key negotiator of NAFTA (Carla A. Hills, 24 April 2013, “A Trans-Atlantic Trade Pact for the World” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/opinion/global/a-trans-atlantic-trade-pact-for-the-world.html?\_r=4&)//SL

The security dimension was real, because in addition to the projected economic benefits, past experience showed that as governments liberalized their trade regimes, they generally liberalized their political regimes. Adherence to an agreed set of trade rules and support for the W.T.O. dispute settlement mechanism encourages nondiscrimination, transparency and rule of law, which contribute to increased stability. The Doha negotiations broke down in 2005 and have made little progress since. Trade commentators are declaring Doha dead and multilateral negotiations obsolete as governments increasingly have turned to negotiating bilateral and regional trade agreements that create conflicting rules and distort trade by creating trade preferences for the signatories at the expense of those that do not participate. There is legitimate concern that the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements could render the W.T.O. irrelevant and destroy the enormous benefits we derive from our multilateral trading system. What could bring the 159 W.T.O. members back to the table? Ironically, history demonstrates that the successful negotiation of a major regional trade agreement of high quality can provide the necessary catalyst. In 1990, the Uruguay Round collapsed in Brussels. In June 1991 the United States, Mexico and Canada launched the negotiations of a North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta). Fourteen months later negotiations were concluded. President George H.W. Bush signed the agreement in December 1992; President Clinton secured congressional approval of the agreement the following year. By joining the economies of Canada, Mexico and the U.S., Nafta created a regional market of over 400 million people. It was the first comprehensive free trade agreement to join developed and developing nations, and it achieved broader and deeper trade liberalization than any prior trade agreement. The world’s reaction was broad, deep and fast. In just a few months following the passage of the Nafta, trade negotiators returned to the bargaining table, completed the Uruguay Round, and created the W.T.O. to the enormous benefit of the global economy. If we are to repeat the success of two decades ago, we will require an even greater catalyst: a regional trade agreement of such quality and scope that the rest of the world is galvanized. The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership recently announced by the European Union and the United States could be that catalyst. That negotiation would involve roughly half the global economy. The negotiation need not be protracted. The E.U. and the U.S. each recently concluded free trade agreements with South Korea that could serve as a template upon which to build. The proposed Trans-Atlantic Partnership could have even more heft if Canada and Mexico were added — which makes sense, since Mexico already has a free trade agreement with the E.U., and Canada is in the final stages of negotiating one. Including them would avoid having different rules covering trade involving our two largest trading partners. The global reaction to Nafta 20 years ago shows that “competitive liberalization” can be a powerful catalyst. When governments see others taking economic action that generates growth and stability, they do not want to be left out. A broad, gold-standard trade agreement across the Atlantic could be such a catalyst for reigniting support for multilateral trade liberalization, bringing W.T.O. members back to the table to finish the Doha Round, which would give a real boost to the global economy. It was done before with the Nafta, and it could be done again with the successful conclusion of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

### EU

#### EU Says no and status quo solves – Aff author

**Meacham 7/25** – director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., former senior advisor for Latin America and the Caribbean on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to Senator Richard Lugar (Carl, “The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Mexico Wants In – Why not?”, 7/25/13; < http://csis.org/publication/trans-atlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-mexico-wants-why-not>)

A2: While Mexico's recent economic growth has proven impressive, entering the TTIP would provide a meaningful surge for the Mexican economy, potentially propelling it into the proverbial big leagues. Mexico's interest in being included in the agreement is no secret, but both the United States and the European Union have ignored the petition, claiming inopportune political circumstances. The reasoning here is twofold.¶ First, given the years of encouragement that preceded the formal start of EU-U.S. negotiations, neither party wishes to jeopardize what could be the biggest FTA in history by bringing more participants on board--regardless of the value their inclusion adds. Leaders from both the United States and the EU think this would bring a long and burdensome political process that could prove detrimental for the negotiations. And though both have shied away from anything that might complicate the process of reaching an initial agreement, neither has rejected the idea of accepting more members down the road, once the agreement is consolidated.¶ The second argument is more of a corollary to the first. At his talk with the Americas Program last week, Christian Leffler, the EU’s managing director for the Americas, explained that because Mexico already shares FTAs with the United States and the EU, including Mexico in the TTIP can be seen as superfluous—at least for now. Particularly given the drag additional parties could put on negotiations, the benefits of including Mexico, so the argument goes, fail to outweigh the potential costs.

**Uniqueness overwhelms the link – first piece of evidence says the EU is baking out of the TTIP because countries like france don’t want to be apart of it – there is no piece of evidence that mexico overcomes that**

**Alt cause – Italy**

Reguly 11/1 - [ERIC REGULY](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/authors/eric-reguly)

ROME — The Globe and Mail [“Italy’s economic woes pose existential threat to euro zone” <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/european-business/italys-economic-woes-pose-existential-threat-to-euro-zone/article15224210/>]

¶ On a sunny Thursday morning in Rome, Alessandro Ambrocci, 26, bounded out of the U.S. consulate on the once-glam via Veneto, beaming as if he had just won the lottery. He was clutching a white envelope; inside was his work visa.¶ It was Arrivederci, Italia time for him.¶ Mr. Ambrocci trained as an engineer, couldn’t find work, retrained as a bartender and landed jobs on cruise ships. His new visa will not allow him to work in the United States proper, but it will allow him to travel there to board the ships. So he was off to Miami.¶ “I could work here [as a bartender] but I would pay too much tax,” he said. “In Italy, we have the wrong mentality. The politicians want to keep all the money for themselves.”¶ I asked him what he thought of Silvio Berlusconi, the former prime minister who vowed to clean up Italy’s economic act only to fail miserably on all fronts.¶ “I hate Berlusconi,” he said. “He talked, talked, talked but didn’t do anything but steal money. That’s the Italian problem. Talk, talk, talk and do nothing.” Mr. Berlusconi has been convicted of tax fraud and faces expulsion from parliament.¶ Mr. Ambrocci represents Italian youth – smart, energetic, well-trained and utterly fed up with the corruption, inefficiency and moral and economic rot that has infiltrated their country like a cancer. So they abandon the country.¶ I have lived in Italy for six years and have never seen its citizens worry so much about their children, whether those children are kids, university students or young adults starting families. There is no work, or work so beneath their skill levels they can barely muster the enthusiasm to get out of bed in the morning.¶ Every young Italian I know is leaving the country, or wants to. The U.S., Canadian and British consulates in Rome are seeing a surge in work-visa applications from desperate Italians.¶ Statistics released on Thursday confirm that Italy suffers a hellish employment problem. The overall jobless rate ticked up in September to 12.5 per cent, the highest since the records began in 1977. The youth jobless rate also rose, to 40.4 per cent, approaching Greek levels.¶ Even as the rest of the euro zone emerges from the economic crypt, Italy alone continues to dig its grave, tragically unaware of Warren Buffett’s maxim: “The most important thing to do if you find yourself in a hole is to stop digging.”¶ Besides being a textbook case for relentless wealth destruction, Italy poses an existential threat to the euro zone. Forget Greece; its economy is the size of a corner store compared with Italy. Italy is a Group of Eight country. Its economy is bigger than Canada’s. It is the euro zone’s third-largest player and second-biggest manufacturer, after Germany. If Italy goes down, the euro zone is finished.¶

**The EU impact is empirically denied – they had a triple dip recession**

#### No impact to warming and it’s not anthro

Carter et al. 13, Idso, Craig D. Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change USA Carter, Robert M. Emeritus Fellow Institute of Public Affairs Australia Singer, S. Fred Science and Environmental Policy Project USA Ball, Timothy Research Fellow Frontier Centre for Public Policy Canada Easterbrook, Don J. Professor Emeritus of Geology Western Washington University USA Idso, Craig D. Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change USA Idso, Sherwood Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change USA Khandekar, Madhav Former Research Scientist Environment Canada Canada Kininmonth, William Science Advisor Australian Climate Science Coalition Australia de Lange, Willem Science and Engineering Department The University of Waikato New Zealand Lüning, Sebastian Geologist and Author Germany Lupo, Anthony School of Natural Resources University of Missouri USA Ollier, Cliff School of Earth and Geographical Sciences University of Western Australia Australia Soon, Willie Independent Scientist USA Armstrong, J. Scott Wharton School University of Pennsylvania USA D’Aleo, Joseph Co-chief Meteorologist Weatherbell Analytic USA Easterbrook, Don J. Professor Emeritus of Geology Western Washington University USA Green, Kesten International Graduate School of Business University of South Australia Australia McKitrick, Ross Department of Economics University of Guelph Canada Ollier, Cliff School of Earth and Geographical Sciences University of Western Australia Australia Segalstad, Tom Resource and Environmental Geology University of Oslo Norway Singer, S. Fred Science and Environmental Policy Project USA Spencer, Roy Principal Research Scientist University of Alabama in Huntsville USA Abdussamatov, Habibullo Space Research Laboratory Pulkovo Observatory Russian Academy of Sciences Russia Bastardi, Joe Co-chief Meteorologist Weatherbell Analytic USA Battaglia, Franco Professor of Environmental Chemistry University of Modena Italy Bowen, David Q. Professor Emeritus, School of Earth & Ocean Sciences Cardiff University UK Clark, Roy Ventura Photonics USA Courtillot, Vincent Professor Emeritus University Paris Diderot and Institut de Physique du Globe France Essex, Christopher Department of Applied Mathematics University of Western Ontario Canada Evans, David Independent Scientist, Sciencespeak.com, and Former Carbon Modeller Australian Greenhouse Office Australia Floderus, Sören Consultant SF Bureau Denmark Franks, Stewart W. School of Engineering University of Newcastle Australia Friis-Christensen, Eigil Professor Emeritus National Space Institute Technical University of Denmark Denmark Goldberg, Fred Swedish Polar Institute Sweden Gould, Laurence Professor of Physics University of Hartford USA Gray, William Emeritus Professor of Atmospheric Science Colorado State University USA Gray, Vincent Richard Climate Consultant New Zealand Hayden, Howard Professor of Physics Emeritus University of Connecticut USA Hovland, Martin Professor Emeritus Centre for Geobiology University of Bergen Norway Kärner, Olavi Atmospheric Sensing Group Tartu Observatory Estonia O’Brien, James Department of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric Science Florida State University USA Paltridge, Garth Emeritus Professor and Honorary Research Fellow University of Tasmania Australia Rapp, Donald Senior Research Scientist and Division Chief Technologist (retired) Jet Propulsion Lab USA Ribbing, Carl Department of Engineering Sciences, Solid State Physics Uppsala University Sweden Scafetta, Nicola Department of Physics Duke University USA Shade, John Industrial Statistics Consultant UK Sharp, Gary Independent Consultant Center for Climate/ Ocean Resources Study USA Solheim, Jan-Erik Professor emeritus Department of Physics and Technology University of Tromsø Norway Uriarte Cantolla, Antón Sociedad de Ciencias Naturales Aranzadi Spain Weber, Gerd-Rainer Independent Meteorologist Germany Editors Karnick , S.T. The Heartland Institute USA Bast, Diane Carol The Heartland Institute USA, (“Climate Change Reconsidered II: Physical Science”, http://climatechangereconsidered.org/#tabs-1-1, assorted documents – sort through the wesbite, September 2013) Kerwin

• Atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) is a mild greenhouse gas that exerts a diminishing warming effect as its concentration increases. • Doubling the concentration of atmospheric CO2 from its pre-industrial level, in the absence of other forcings and feedbacks, would likely cause a warming of ~0.3 to 1.1°C, almost 50% of which must already have occurred. • A few tenths of a degree of additional warming, should it occur, would not represent a climate crisis. • Model outputs published in successive IPCC reports since 1990 project a doubling of CO2 could cause warming of up to 6°C by 2100. Instead, global warming ceased around the end of the twentieth century and was followed (since 1997) by 16 years of stable temperature. • Over recent geological time, Earth’s temperature has fluctuated naturally between about +4°C and -6°C with respect to twentieth century temperature. A warming of 2°C above today, should it occur, falls within the bounds of natural variability. • Though a future warming of 2°C would cause geographically varied ecological responses, no evidence exists that those changes would be net harmful to the global environment or to human well-being. • At the current level of ~400 ppm we still live in a CO2-starved world. Atmospheric levels 15 times greater existed during the Cambrian Period (about 550 million years ago) without known adverse effects. • The overall warming since about 1860 corresponds to a recovery from the Little Ice Age modulated by natural multidecadal cycles driven by ocean-atmosphere oscillations, or by solar variations at the de Vries (~208 year) and Gleissberg (~80 year) and shorter periodicities. • Earth has not warmed significantly for the past 16 years despite an 8% increase in atmospheric CO2, which represents 34% of all extra CO2 added to the atmosphere since the start of the industrial revolution. • CO2 is a vital nutrient used by plants in photosynthesis. Increasing CO2 in the atmosphere “greens” the planet and helps feed the growing human population. • No close correlation exists between temperature variation over the past 150 years and humanrelated CO2 emissions. The parallelism of temperature and CO2 increase between about 1980 and 2000 AD could be due to chance and does not necessarily indicate causation. • The causes of historic global warming remain uncertain, but significant correlations exist between climate patterning and multidecadal variation and solar activity over the past few hundred years. • Forward projections of solar cyclicity imply the next few decades may be marked by global cooling rather than warming, despite continuing CO2 emissions.

#### They don’t solve the TTIP—they’re skeptical of the NSA—that’s their evidence

IPCC is flawed and trying to cover its mistakes

Daily Mail 9/23, this article is citing Dr Richard Lindzen, an MIT climate professor, (“MIT scientist ridicules IPCC climate change report, calls findings 'hilarious incoherence' ”, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2438434/MIT-scientist-ridicules-IPCC-climate-change-report-calls-findings-hilarious-incoherence.html, 9/23/2013) Kerwin

Not all experts agree with the latest United Nations report on global warming, some are even amused by its findings. A climate scientist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has come out blasting the report for blaming humans for a global warming trend that appears to have cooled in recent decades – and then glossing over the warming slowdown. ‘I think that the latest IPCC report has truly sunk to level of hilarious incoherence,’ Dr. Richard Lindzen told Climate Depot – a site known for questioning the theory of global warming. Dr Linzen’s amusement from the lack of correlation between predictions and actual conditions. ‘They are proclaiming increased confidence in their models as the discrepancies between their models and observations increase,’ Dr Linzen continued. The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change asserted in the report that it is 95 per cent sure humans’ use of fossil fuels is the cause of global warming. The report also provided what Dr Linzen felt was a shoddy explanation for the lack of warming over the past 17 years. ‘Their excuse for the absence of warming over the past 17 years is that the heat is hiding in the deep ocean,’ the amused scientist said. ‘However, this is simply an admission that the models fail to simulate the exchanges of heat between the surface layers and the deeper oceans.’ This slapdash explanation for the lack of warming, Dr Linzen stressed, is proof the IPCC knows little about what is actually happening. ‘They now, somewhat obscurely, admit that their crucial assumption was totally unjustified,’ said the amused scientist. Dr Linzen’s derision of the IPCC report comes amid evidence that warming hasn’t occurred over the past 17 years, and that polar ice caps are even [expanding](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2415191/And-global-COOLING-Return-Arctic-ice-cap-grows-29-year.html). Despite strong evidence that global warming may be on hold, the IPCC still insisted that the report’s findings should alarm anyone denying the theory. The report found support among American politicians. Chief among them, Secretary of State John Kerry. ‘Those who deny the science or choose excuses over action are playing with fire,’ Secretary of State John Kerry said shortly after the report’s release. ‘Once again, the science grows clearer, the case grows more compelling and the costs of inaction grow beyond anything that anyone with conscience or common sense should be willing to even contemplate,’ he added.

#### They don’t solve other interest—if people are holding out in the TTIP, it’s not because of Mexico—their evidence also says they don’t like Mexico in the TTIP

**No impact to the economy**

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

**Alt cause- debt crisis**

**MMS 13** [Money Morning Staff, “Expert Warns Debt Crisis Will Spark An Economic Collapse Worse Than 2008 (TZA, FAZ, GLD, SLV, SDS, FAS)” <http://etfdailynews.com/2013/01/23/expert-warns-debt-crisis-will-spark-an-economic-collapse-worse-than-2008-tza-faz-gld-slv-sds-fas/> Jan 23 2013]//BM

[Money Morning Staff:](http://moneymorning.com/) Investors should prepare for an upcoming economic collapse far worse than 2008. That’s according to Peter Schiff, the economist and CEO for Euro-Pacific capital, who says that if drastic steps are not taking in the coming months, America’s $16 trillion federal debt “cancer” will create a massive economic catastrophe unlike anything ever seen. “We have a much bigger collapse coming, not just the markets, but of the economy,” Schiff recently told Yahoo Finance. And Schiff is not alone in warning that the U.S. economy is on the verge of spiraling out-of-control. Since the debt ceiling crisis began heating up, noted economists and investors including Richard Duncan and Nourial Roubani have come to similar conclusions. Roubani recently said that the country has to wake up to the “full extent of its fiscal nightmare.” [Get A Free Trend Analysis For Any Stock Shares Here!](http://quotes.ino.com/analysis/trend/affiliates/?a_aid=CD3765&a_bid=7f00554c) However, while the debt crisis is well known to most Americans, the economy hasn’t suffered a major correction for almost 4 years. So the questions remain: Is the threat of collapse for real? And if so, when? A team of scientists, economists, and geopolitical analysts believes they have proof that the threat is indeed real – and the danger imminent. The work of this team garnered such attention, they were brought in front of the United Nations, UK Parliament, and numerous Fortune 500 companies to share much of their findings.

### WTO

#### The Doha is dead

Bhar 10-23

[Biswajit. The author is director general, Research and Information System for Developing Countries. “Column: A long way from a done Doha deal” 10/23/13 <http://www.financialexpress.com/news/column-a-long-way-from-a-done-doha-deal/1186328/0> //GBS-JV]

An oft-ignored aspect of the Doha Round is that its architects had envisioned a balanced outcome by ensuring that negotiations in all the mandated areas conclude simultaneously. This was reflected in their agreement that the outcome would be in the nature of a “single undertaking”, which really meant that the “Doha Deal” could only be done when WTO Members have concluded agreements on all areas. The WTO-speak in this regard said it all: “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. In practical terms, this approach was extremely significant since it sought to curb the tendencies of the more dominant countries to conclude agreements in areas that suited their interests best (euphemistically called “cherry picking”) and to go slow (or even ignore) in areas in which they had to make concessions. Thus, countries could engage in inter-sectoral trade-offs and this was seen as a big step towards ensuring a balanced outcome.¶ The high ambitions set for the Doha Round have eroded rapidly, particularly since the breakdown of the negotiations in July 2008. The narrow focus of the issues being discussed in the run-up to the Bali Ministerial Conference underlines the extent of erosion of expectations. The agenda engaging the WTO membership looks thin in relation to the overall negotiating mandate of the Round as they cover three areas, viz., trade facilitation, a couple of issues in agriculture and a package for the least developed countries. The focus of the pre-Bali engagement has, however, been on the first two issues.

#### Alt causes to trade cred – disputes with China

OLSTER 8/2 - Marjorie Olster Associated Press Global Economics Correspondent. Washington D.C.. [“WTO backs US in chicken trade dispute with China” <http://news.yahoo.com/wto-backs-us-chicken-trade-dispute-china-151722565.html>]

Officials at the Chinese Embassy in Washington could not immediately be reached for comment.¶ The U.S. runs a larger trade deficit with China than with any other country in the world. The gap widened by 15.6 percent to $27.9 billion for the month of May, the most recent month for which figures are available. That was more than half of the total U.S. trade deficit of $45 billion with the whole world for that month and close to an all-time monthly high set in November. So far this year, the U.S. deficit with China is running 3 percent higher than last year.¶ One of the biggest disputes with China is over its currency. The U.S. accuses Beijing of under-valuing the yuan to gain a trade advantage by making its exports cheaper to drive up domestic growth rates. U.S. officials are pressing China to let the yuan exchange rate float freely against the dollar and shift more to an economy based on domestic consumption instead of relying on exports.¶ They are also urging China to enforce intellectual property rights and roll back subsidies for Chinese state-owned enterprises.¶ Siva Yam, president of the U.S.-China Chamber of Commerce, which primarily represents U.S. companies in China, said the WTO decision will not have much significance for the larger bilateral relationship and that it would continue to be fraught with trade disputes.¶ "I do not believe it will change the equation," he said. "U.S. and China relations will continue to be up and down. ... I think the relationship will become more tense in the future, but not only because of this."¶ He said the U.S. does not export much to China. But because China is one of the only markets in the world for chicken feet and internal chicken organs, it was seeking to gain leverage to counter U.S. dumping complaints against Beijing. He predicted China would now look for other levers to strike back against the U.S.¶ Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack said agricultural exports are a strong and growing component of U.S. exports. Farm exports in fiscal year 2012 reached $135.8 billion and supported 1 million American jobs, he said, adding that more than $23 billion worth of those agricultural products went to China alone.¶ "But China's prohibitive duties on broiler products were followed by a steep decline in exports to China — and now we look forward to seeing China's market for broiler products restored," Vilsack said in a statement.

**Trade disputes don’t escalate – solidified international norms**

**Ikenson, 12** [March 5th, Daniel, [Daniel Ikenson](http://www.cato.org/people/daniel-ikenson) is director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute,

<http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trade-policy-priority-one-averting-uschina-trade-war>]

An emerging narrative in 2012 is that a proliferation of protectionist, treaty-violating, or otherwise illiberal Chinese policies is to blame for worsening U.S.-China relations. China trade experts from across the ideological and political spectra have lent credibility to that story. Business groups that once counseled against U.S. government actions that might be perceived by the Chinese as provocative have changed their tunes. The term "trade war" is no longer taboo.¶ The media have portrayed the United States as a victim of underhanded Chinese practices, including currency manipulation, dumping, subsidization, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, discriminatory "indigenous innovation" policies, export restrictions, industrial espionage, and other ad hoc impediments to U.S. investment and exports. ¶ Indeed, it is beyond doubt that certain Chinese policies have been provocative, discriminatory, protectionist, and, in some cases, violative of the agreed rules of international trade. But there is more to the story than that. U.S. policies, politics, and attitudes have contributed to rising tensions, as have rabble-rousing politicians and a confrontation-thirsty media. If the public's passions are going to be inflamed with talk of a trade war, prudence demands that the war's nature be properly characterized and its causes identified and accurately depicted.¶ Those agitating for tough policy actions should put down their battle bugles and consider that trade wars are never won. Instead, such wars claim victims indiscriminately and leave significant damage in their wake. Even if one concludes that China's list of offenses is collectively more egregious than that of the United States, the most sensible course of action — for the American public (if not campaigning politicians) — is one that avoids mutually destructive actions and finds measures to reduce frictions with China.¶ Nature of the U.S.-China Trade War¶ It should not be surprising that the increasing number of commercial exchanges between entities in the world's largest and second largest economies produce frictions on occasion. But the U.S.-China economic relationship has not descended into an existential call to arms**.** Rather, both governments have taken protectionist actions that are legally defensible or plausibly justifiable within the rules of global trade. That is not to say that those measures have been advisable or that they would withstand closer legal scrutiny, but to make the distinction that, unlike the free-for-all that erupted in the 1930s, these trade "skirmishes" have been prosecuted in a manner that speaks to a mutual recognition of the primacy of — if not respect for — the rules-based system of trade. And that suggests that the kerfuffle is containable and the recent trend reversible.1

**And, alt causes outweigh and prove trade is empirically denied**

**Zappone, 12** [January, Chris, Sydney Morning Herald, 'Murky protectionism' on the rise - but no trade war, <http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/murky-protectionism-on-the-rise--but-no-trade-war-20120110-1pt3t.html>]

At the outset of the global financial crisis, the world’s leaders pledged to resist calls to shield their local economies in order to prevent a trade war that could further damage global growth.¶ Four years on, with China slowing, Europe heading into recession and a political environment soured by successive financial crises, the question arises: how long will policymakers be able to resist those calls for more protectionism?¶ “Free trade is going to be under pressure,” said Lowy Institute international economy program director Mark Thirlwell. “Since 2007-08 the case for moving to greater trade liberalisation has got tougher and the demands for protection have increased.”¶ Only last week, China, which is grappling with a slowdown, raised the prospect of a trade war with the European Union in response to the EU's implementation of a carbon emissions tax on air travel to and from Europe. Earlier last month China imposed tariffs up to 21 per cent on US-made cars, affecting about $US4 billion imports a year.¶ Advertisement ¶ Across the Pacific, US politicians in the throes of an election year with 8.5 per cent unemployment have issued more strident calls for China to “play by the rules” and allow the yuan to appreciate faster against the US dollar. The US has also asked the World Trade Organisation to probe China's support for its solar panel industry and the restrictions Beijing has placed on US poultry imports.¶ In fact, the most recent WTO data shows that the number of trade restrictive measures enacted by members rose 53 per cent to 339 occurrences over the year to October.¶ Yet the WTO admits that the motives behind the spate of actions aren’t always simply to protect local jobs. “Not all measures categorised as trade restrictive may have been adopted with such an intention,” the body said.¶ In Brazil, for example, the steep rise in the value of its currency, the real, has sparked a torrent of car imports into the country - similar to the online-overseas shopping boom in Australia. Brazil has in turn put a one-year provisional 30 per cent increase on auto imports, to counterbalance the effects of their strong currency.¶ In the US, China and Australia, infrastructure spending measures contain “buy local” requirements to stoke domestic growth, not necessary punish foreign businesses. The federal government in September streamlined its anti-dumping system that eases the way for companies to ask for investigations into imported goods that come in below market value to Australia. Again, well within the rules.¶ “What we’ve seen is a gradual ratcheting up of trade intervention,” said Mr Thirlwell, amounting to what he calls “murky protectionism” or government intervention through support for industries or complaints to global trade authorities.¶ To date, observers such as Mr Thirlwell say most countries have remained remarkably resistant to throwing up significant trade barriers.¶ For example, in November, the US, Australia and seven other Asian-Pacific nations including Japan, outlined the plan for an ambitious multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership trade block worth 40 per cent of the world’s trade, in an effort to increase the flow of cross-border goods and investment. Japan, China and South Korea are also in the later stages of negotiation over a free trade deal between those three nations.¶ Australian National University international trade lecturer John Tang doesn’t believe the world is on the edge a new round of protectionism.¶ “I don’t see a general sea change towards protectionism for major trading blocks but that may be because so much of the industrialised world is relying on developing countries to sustain their exports,” he said.¶ Nevertheless, a shift in the political reality of the US, China or elsewhere could change that, he said.¶ Washington DC-based Brookings Institution fellow Joshua Meltzer said that if the euro zone broke up, elevating the crisis to a new stage, nations may switch to much more protective measures.¶ ‘‘I wouldn’t go so far to say the global economy is so integrated that we could never have anything that would approach a trade war,” said Washington DC-based Brookings Institution fellow Joshua Meltzer. “But I don’t think we’re on that track.”

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#### Have a high threshold for solvency deficits—we are reading their 1ac evidence back at them which means you shouldn’t allow them to quantify a solvency deficit

#### View the counterplan debate through the lens of sufficient versus optimal

#### Including Canada solves and small steps solve

**Ikenson 10/14** – Director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, former director of international trade planning for an international business advisory firm (Daniel J., “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A Roadmap for Success” 10/14/13; <http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/transatlantic-trade-investment-partnership-roadmap-success>)//Beddow

The potential upside of a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement to liberalize trade, investment, and regulatory barriers between the United States and the European Union is substantial. **The economic benefits are estimated to be in the range of a $125 billion annual boost to GDP on each side of the Atlantic. Realistically, the benefits will depend on whether the enthusiastic rhetorical commitments to achieving a comprehensive agreement are matched by actual accomplishments on the ground**. A comprehensive, ambitious agreement will require the resolution of differences in dozens of areas. On some issues, bridging the divides should be fairly straightforward, though not necessarily easy. On others, success will require copious amounts of determination, ingenuity, and political will. Stakeholders will have to keep politicians and negotiators accountable to their goals and timetables. But too daunting an enterprise will render success elusive and cause negotiators to lose focus, interest, and, ultimately, the opportunity to achieve meaningful reforms. The TTIP negotiations must not be permitted to devolve into a decade-long, transatlantic cocktail party for negotiators, advisers, and lobbyists. In the interest of avoiding that fate, this paper suggests a procedural roadmap for managing the negotiations in an orderly, constructive, politically digestible manner. It recommends that Negotiators identify and announce a discrete set of specific, achievable goals with realistic deadlines; The negotiations over regulatory processes and regulatory standards be better defined and made more manageable by employing a “negative list” approach, where issues deemed “off limits” to negotiation are specified at the outset so that they do not obscure what is achievable; The negotiators abandon the single undertaking principle and, instead, aim to produce three successive biennial agreements by harvesting the lowest hanging fruit once every two years. Managing with forethought and determination a process that could otherwise descend into an intractable quagmire is essential to ensuring that negotiators deliver most of what they promise. Toward Greater Economic Integration The idea of a transatlantic trade agreement has been floating around for many years, dating back to the Marshall Plan. Certainly there are compelling rationales for such an agreement, including shared cultural ties, a common history of multilateral institution building, and similar commitments to democratic governance. Moreover, the U.S. and EU economies are already significantly integrated. Bilateral trade amounts to about $1 trillion per year and cross-border direct investment stocks total $3.7 trillion. Bilateral direct investment between the United States and European Union constitutes the most intertwined, cross-border investment relationship in the world. The combined economies account for $34 trillion in GDP (nearly half of the world’s output) and more than one-third of all global trade flows involve U.S. or EU entities. **Reducing barriers that raise the cost of transatlantic commerce would generate greater efficiencies and more scope for specialization and economies of scale, spawning economic growth and higher living standards**. But these aren’t new revelations. So, why, after all of these years of relationship-building, was TTIP formally launched in 2013? Why, after many years of knocking this idea around and concluding that the obstacles were too daunting, did policymakers decide those impediments surmountable? Transatlantic Agreement: Why Now? As great as the benefits may be, the TTIP was not borne of any genuine enthusiasm for the enterprise. In Europe, it was seen as a last resort. Frustrated by the failures of monetary policy and restricted by the imperative of fiscal austerity, policymakers were looking for something—anything—to embrace as a potential economic tonic. Whether they actually thought TTIP likely to bear fruit is an entirely different matter. They wanted something to behold as evidence that Greece did not represent Europe’s fate. Potential voter wrath, political backlash, and stalemate–historically effective deterrents to initiating transatlantic trade talks–took a back seat to the affirmative optics of embracing some plausible initiative that might steer Europe from the abyss. For U.S. policymakers, the main motivation for launching TTIP was to assuage EU concerns that the United States had written her off in its "pivot" to Asia. Other rationales for pursuing TTIP include the argument that the world needs the United States and European Union to reassert global economic leadership at a time when no other country or group of countries is willing or able to do so. Another is that there is a race to establish global production standards and TTIP, representing half the world’s output, presents an opportunity to establish them here and now. A third ex-post rationale is that by establishing disciplines on issues where other trade agreements are silent—issues like currency manipulation, the operations of state-owned enterprises, local content rules, and others—the United States and EU could establish rules that China and others would eventually have to heed. It is within this context that TTIP emerged. But none of those rationales–pursuing TTIP as a last resort, assuaging hurt feelings, establishing standards, disciplining China and others–seem likely to provide the motivation for negotiators and governments to dig deep and remain committed enough to make difficult choices that may carry political consequences. As the talks drag, will governments remain committed to the goals? Will governments motivated by the "last resort" rationale continue to invest seriously in the negotiations if their economies experience growth and the political costs of TTIP no longer look so necessary to incur? Already there have been signs of retreat from the ambitious goals articulated at the outset. Taking Small, Digestible Bites Is Key to TTIP Success From the outset, negotiators erred by setting a 2014 completion date for the negotiations. There is absolutely no plausibility to that deadline and, frankly, failure to amend the timetable with realistic deadlines will only undermine the credibility of the undertaking with a public already skeptical of trade negotiations. There are dozens of issues on the table of varying complexity that will likely take several years to resolve**. Rather than have a single deadline for a single undertaking, the negotiators should announce that their intention is to achieve a multi-tiered agreement that yields multiple harvests at established time intervals. Some analysts have referred to the TTIP as a "living agreement,"** although a common understanding of that concept is not evident nor, to my knowledge, have the governments or their negotiators used this characterization in any official context. They should. And it should work something like this. Negotiators would take stock of the issues on the table and rank them in order of importance to a successful TTIP conclusion. They would then rank those same issues in terms of order of difficulty to resolve. Based on averaging and some agreed upon weighting of those two sets of rankings, negotiators would identify what they and their counterparts see as the most important and least important issues, as well as the most difficult and least difficult issues to resolve. That exercise would produce a road map for how to proceed. In April the Atlantic Council and the Bertelsmann Foundation co-published an excellent paper that was based primarily on a survey of trade experts in the United States and Europe, who were asked to identify the likely TTIP issues and rank them from most important for a successful conclusion to least important.1 (See Figure 1.) They were then asked to rank those same issues from most to least difficult to resolve. The results were then plotted in a matrix with the level of importance tracked along the horizontal axis and the level of difficulty tracked along the vertical axis. The most populated area of the matrix is the upper right quadrant, which is where the issues that are most important and most difficult to achieve reside. The fact that 8 of the 17 issues identified fall into that quadrant reinforces the conclusion that a 2014 deadline for a comprehensive agreement is woefully unrealistic. Achieving regulatory process convergence was considered the most important and the second most difficult issue to resolve, just behind "Genetically Modified Organisms and Agriculture" in terms of difficulty. Tariff reduction and elimination was considered among the most important issues, but the easiest issue to resolve. Labor standards convergence was considered the least important issue likely to be on the table. But the greatest utility of this presentation of the issues is that it identifies the low-hanging fruit, and prioritizes those issues by importance. Everything below 3.5 on the vertical axis can be considered the low-hanging fruit. The "relatively" low-hanging fruit would be the 8 or 9 lowest issues on the vertical axis. Certainly, these issues are not exhaustive, nor are their positions on the matrix constant. Over time, and as events unfold, some of these issues will become more (or less) important and more (or less) difficult. For example, since the survey results reflected in this matrix were published, the NSA spying scandal came to light, rendering the "data protection/privacy" issue much more difficult to resolve than it would have been otherwise. Europeans are now far more skeptical that U.S. companies can guarantee the privacy of their information. That issue probably belongs much higher in the matrix now and, in fact, may be off the chart. Likewise, the issue of audio visual (A/V) quotas has been carved out from the negotiations at the behest of France. It may very likely be off the chart now or, at least, at a much higher vertical point than it was a few months ago. Other issues, such as transatlantic competition in the commercial aviation and shipping transportation industries did not even make the list, despite the enormous upside to reform in those heavily protected industries. Customizing the Matrix for the TTIP Negotiations The Atlantic Council/Bertelsmann Foundation matrix provides a useful analytical starting point for constructing a TTIP roadmap. The negotiators should begin by identifying the most important issues and ranking them according to difficulty. If the timetable for ultimate completion of the negotiations is to include three biennial harvests–one every two years–then the goal for each two-year tranche would be to reach agreement on 33 percent of the current issues by focusing on the easiest matters each time (harvesting the lowest hanging fruit). After reaching accord on the first tranche of issues and implementing the first phase of the agreement, negotiators would re-rank the remaining issues and identify the easiest 50 percent as the low-hanging fruit. After concluding the second tranche, they would implement and move to resolving the remaining issues (the most difficult by definition) in the final two-year negotiating tranche. The point of this approach is to improve chances for success. By breaking up the TTIP into more easily digestible pieces, negotiators are less likely to choke, and governments and stakeholders are more likely to stay engaged. What is needed for success is enthusiasm. What breeds enthusiasm are tastes of success. And tastes of success can come from setting and reaching goals in shorter increments, starting with agreement on the lowest hanging fruit first. Negative List Approach to Regulatory Issues To facilitate the process of identifying what matters to tackle in what order, the issues should be identified as specifically as possible. If they are too broadly specified, then the potential to identify low-hanging fruit will be obscured. That is precisely the problem afflicting the issues of regulatory standard convergence and regulatory process convergence, which are widely considered the source of TTIP’s greatest potential gains, as it is enormously costly whenever businesses have to meet different standards to participate in different markets. There seem to be vague and perhaps disparate understandings of what regulatory reform entails. Commentators have tended to refer to these issues monolithically. It would be conducive to break these issues up and separate what is on the table from what is not. This can be achieved through adoption of what negotiators call a "negative list" approach. A negative list includes all issues that negotiators identify as off limits to negotiation. Everything not on the list is on the table. Creating a negative list for regulatory issues will help negotiators, and the public, obtain a better sense of the contours of this otherwise amorphous blob of issues, revealing a more useful diagnosis of the regulatory incoherence problem. By placing issues off limits to the negotiations, it becomes clear what is on the table. And that will help negotiators identify the lower hanging fruit of regulatory reform. For all regulatory issues on the table, negotiators should default to a standard of mutual recognition. If that approach is for some reason untenable, then convergence toward a single standard should be the approach with the standard selected being the least intrusive or least costly approach and, if disagreement remains still, by attempting to divide the chosen standards equally between both sides. Recognizing that the U.S. standard of three-foot electrical cords on household appliances is equivalent to the EU standard of one meter (3’3") long cords in terms of ensuring consumer safety might be a sensible reform that reduces appliance production costs and lowers consumer prices. Mutually recognizing the equivalence of each other’s drug approval processes would eliminate logistical redundancies, saving industry excessive delays and billions of dollars, while reducing mortality and morbidity rates. There are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of similar regulatory processes and standards that could be bridged through such mutual recognition or convergence. **Other Crucial Issues to TTIP Success Establishing a formula to continuously drive the negotiations forward is a necessary, but by no means sufficient, condition of TTIP success. Obstacles abound. First, abandoning the "single undertaking" approach to trade negotiations will require convincing traditionalists wed to the idea that liberalization of barriers requires cross-sector trading of concessions.** Each negotiating tranche might require some customization to ensure that there are adequate trade-offs, where the U.S. and EU negotiators have a relatively equal number of offensive and defensive interests. Second, opponents will try to define the TTIP in a negative light. Some will cast harmonization of standards and mutual recognition of regulations as an effort by industry to pad its bottom line at the expense of public health and safety. Regulatory agencies will encourage these ad campaigns, as their power to make or break will be reduced by smart reform. Supporters will have to demonstrate how superfluous regulations do not make the public safer, but instead add unnecessary costs to production that are passed on to consumers and diminish the resources available to invest in economic activity and job creation. Compliance with regulations costs U.S. industry $1.75 trillion per year, which exceeds the annual value added of the entire U.S. manufacturing sector.2 Third, **what about Canada and Mexico, and even Turkey? The North American market is highly integrated in many industries with cross-border production and supply chains that send goods and services back and forth across the border on a daily basis.** A TTIP that does not include clear and reasonable accession provisions for Canada, Mexico, and Turkey (which is highly integrated with the EU) would be trade diverting and would represent an enormous opportunity cost. Fourth, comprehensive agreement will require green lights from both sides on numerous issues, but on issues concerning regulatory reform and government procurement, to name some, U.S. state-level and EU country-level officials also will have to be sufficiently satisfied with the deal for it to proceed. Issues pertaining to federalism and European state sovereignty make these sub-federal entities potentially obstructive players in the negotiations. Fifth, to complicate matters further, **there is widespread concern that a comprehensive TTIP agreement would be the death knell for the World Trade Organization**. If new rules are established by the world’s largest economies outside of the multilateral system, the WTO could descend into irrelevance. But some multilateral realists, who acknowledge that negotiating complex agreements with 160 member governments at disparate levels of economic development is no longer a viable option for liberalization, have argued that TTIP can "save" the WTO. By achieving concurrence on some very complicated 21st century issues, TTIP could blaze the path for the WTO by presenting some best practices, which could ultimately be multilateralized and adopted by the WTO. Such an objective should be kept in mind as the TTIP negotiations proceed so that its terms can be more easily multilateralized in the future. Conclusion Whether or not the TTIP produces an ambitious, comprehensive agreement will depend on numerous factors. Keeping negotiators focused on the task and governments continuously supportive of their efforts may be the most important requirement. Setting and achieving discrete goals with discrete deadlines—three smaller, successive agreements reached and implemented every two years by harvesting the lowest-hanging fruit first—offers a promising start. The process will require rejecting the single undertaking approach to negotiations, where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. To improve chances for success, it will also need to employ a negative list approach for regulatory issues so as to distill and identify what is and is not achievable.

### Aff ev

**They are putting *all of their eggs* in the Pastor card – which is really problematic because this card says that if the United States negotiated with the EU EXTERNAL FROM THE TTIP, the EU would want the TTIP – that’s not the aff**

**Pastor 3/5**/13 Professor and Founding Director of the Center for North American Studies at American University (Robert A. Pastor, 5 March 2013, “Shortcut to U.S. Economic Competitiveness: A Seamless North American Market,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/north-america/shortcut-us-economic-competitiveness-seamless-north-american-market/p30132)//SL

THE CASE FOR A NORTH AME RICAN MARKET ¶ With rising competitive pressures from overseas and weak growth at home, the quickest external route to economic recovery and enhanced competitiveness is to stretch the U.S. market to include 113 million Mexicans and 34 million Canadians. The Obama administration has made it a priority to complete the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with Asia and has announced its intention to launch a new U.S.-European Union Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). But the administration has neglected its two neighbors despite the fact that their combined product is more than six times that of other TPP countries and that U.S. exports to them exceed those to the EU. Mexico and Canada are already the United States’ two largest export markets, its two largest sources of energy imports, and in the case of Mexico, the largest source of immigrants. The three countries also make products together. Unlike U.S. trade with most other countries, roughly 25 to 40 percent of the value of U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico comes from components made in the United States, and then assembled into finished goods in one of the two countries. Closer integration would translate into a more efficient supply chain and improved competitiveness. With labor costs in China rising to those in Mexico, and the cost of transportation across the Pacific increasing, a North American supply chain is not only more efficient than an Asian route, but it could also become a strong export platform to Asia. Moreover, if the United States seeks a unified approach to trade negotiations with Mexico and Canada, Asia and Europe will recognize that Washington has other options, and prospects for concluding transpacific and transatlantic trade deals would likely improve. For example, in the 1990s, world trade talks were stalemated until NAFTA was signed. Pg. 1-2

#### The rines ev makes a lot of Neg args -- NSA means the EU doesn’t want it, other FTA’s solve the economy, France wont bargain, TTIP doesn’t solve the economy

**Rines 10/29** – economist with Chilton Capital Management, Research Assistant at University of New Hampshire, former Summer Student Fellow at American Institute for Economic Research, education at Georgetown, Oxford, and Whittemore School of Business and Economics, equity analyst, writer for WSJ (Samuel, “Can TTIP Save the West?”, 10/29/13; < http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-ttip-save-the-west-9325>)//Beddow

After watching their economies stagnate and sputter forward, two economic titans are sitting down to talk about a trade agreement. Currently in the early stages of negotiation between the US and European Union, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) could be critically important (and positive) for the future of both economies. Already critical markets for one another, the EU and US trade relationship accounts for about 30 percent of global trade, and $1.5 trillion in current-account transactions. This relationship may become much cozier soon. Normally, free-trade agreements (FTAs) would break down the barriers to trade by lowering and removing tariffs, but tariffs are already low between the world’s two largest economies. Lowering nontariff barriers to trade (NTBs) is the true prize here. NTBs make up most of the actual impediments to trade between the US and EU, and include everything from technical requirements on goods to health and agricultural standards. Mutual recognition of standards—the EU recognizing the FDA stamp of approval in drug development, for example—is an area in which agreement could create a meaningful positive feedback to both economies. For the TTIP to have a pronounced economic impact, regulatory standards will need to be integrated significantly. With the US and EU together constituting 50 percent of the world’s economy, setting firm, mutually recognized standards could spur a de facto global standards regime. Because they are imperative, NTBs also run the risk of sidelining the TTIP as lobbies and interest groups apply political pressure. Externalities are already disturbing the trade talks. The recent U.S. government shutdown caused U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman to cancel the second round of negotiations which had been scheduled for October 7—not the best way to begin an already delicate process. The recent NSA spying fiasco is stoking concerns over data privacy and lessening already tenuous trust in US institutions. Needless to say, there is a skeptical undertone to the intellectual-property portion of the talks. The French recently summoned the US ambassador with questions about the NSA’s activities, and President Obama was forced to call Angela Merkel to tell her the US was not tapping her phone. But while these may be embarrassing instances, the rewards for removing even a portion of the NTBs are too great to ignore. The EU will fight for the inclusion of language surrounding the protection of geographical indications (GIs). GIs—designations on goods indicating a specific geographical origin or a certain quality—are potentially very valuable. The US would argue that words like Parmesan and Pilsner indicate broad product categories, not specific places. A strengthening of GIs would benefit Europe, and some global marketing by US firms with certain products would have to change. Thus far, the US has not supported GIs as a global standard, but this may change if the EU concedes some controversial point(s) on their side. Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are a potential flashpoint. Opposition to GMOs is strong in the EU, where all GMOs must be labeled. Part of the EU’s distrust of a potential settlement around GMOs is a broader threat to their perceived high level of consumer-protection standards. The EU’s “precautionary principle” requires the producer to prove that a product is not harmful to consumers, but the US adheres to a “science-based approach” where the product must be shown to be detrimental to health before its removal. The GMO issue is important for both sides. Europeans want to know about their food, and majorities of key US crops are genetically engineered. The EU already imports more agricultural goods from the US than any other country except Brazil, and the US is the largest importer of EU agricultural products. The US and EU need the TTIP, not only to compete more favorably with the emerging world, but to spur growth in a time of stagnation on both sides of the Atlantic. The OECD has estimated that the TTIP could boost the EU economy 3-3.5 percent. More than a million jobs could be created in the US. Spain and Italy could see 140,000, and the UK more than 400,000. And per capita income could rise more than 6 percent in Spain, 10 percent in the UK, and 13 percent in the US. Not everyone will be so thrilled. A successful TTIP would erode the value of trade agreements already in place. Some countries that have long been trade partners with the US and EU will suffer. The US’s NAFTA neighbors, Mexico and Canada, will suffer relative trade losses as their trade treatment loses its exclusivity. (This likely explains the recent push by Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, Eduardo Medina Mora, for Mexico’s inclusion in TTIP**.)** The BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) will find their long-standing advantages of low-cost labor and production slipping. In the case of a comprehensive agreement between the US and EU that includes the removal of at least some NTBs, the Bertelsmann Foundation estimates the BRICs loss of export and import trade at more than 30% to the US and EU. The TTIP is not the only FTA currently being negotiated by the EU or the US. The EU currently has 11 such negotiations underway. And they are set to discuss an investment agreement with China (though not an FTA). The EU estimates that if all their agreements were concluded and effected today, then 2.2 million jobs could be created and 2.2 percent added to the EU’s GDP. The US is involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which completed its 19th round of talks and includes a host of countries from Asia and the Americas. Again, no BRIC countries are involved, and it would be the second largest FTA to the TTIP. The nations involved in the TTP comprise 38 percent of the world’s GDP, but US participation in the discussions is mainly political—a piece of the “Asian pivot”. However, the success of the TTIP is not guaranteed. France, which has little to gain from the TTIP and therefore little incentive to bargain, has already managed to exclude “cultural exceptions” from the talks. Meanwhile Germany and the UK, which have the most to gain, are looking for the most comprehensive TTIP possible. The TTIP could, in fact, be a reason the UK has stayed in the EU. The TTIP is not a silver bullet. Its potential economic benefits should be met with at least some skepticism. The predicted gains are almost too good to be true. Consider this: If the US were to gain the entirety of its 1.1 million potential jobs today, it would reduce the unemployment rate to the Fed’s target of about 6.5 percent from 7.2 (assuming all else equal). It is probable the expectations for the negotiation will prove to be somewhat optimistic, and leave many NTBs untouched and mutual regulatory standards undetermined. The US and EU are in desperate need of growth and job generators at the moment. A bold TTIP alters the global playing field, tipping the trading field in favor of the developed world. While politically difficult, its ultimate outcome has significant ramifications for the future of global trade and regulatory standards. The economic benefits, sorely sought by both sides of the Atlantic, outweigh some of the differences in regulatory thought. With the prospect for meaningful GDP and job gains in the US, maybe the TTIP is just the push the U.S. economy needs to attain escape velocity and for the EU to begin to reduce unemployment and reaccelerate growth. It is time for the West to regain its place of leadership and prominence in the global economy.

#### Canada and Turkey are alt causes – we all remember cross ex

**Ikenson 10/14** – Director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, former director of international trade planning for an international business advisory firm (Daniel J., “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A Roadmap for Success” 10/14/13; <http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/transatlantic-trade-investment-partnership-roadmap-success>)//Beddow

The potential upside of a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement to liberalize trade, investment, and regulatory barriers between the United States and the European Union is substantial. **The economic benefits are estimated to be in the range of a $125 billion annual boost to GDP on each side of the Atlantic. Realistically, the benefits will depend on whether the enthusiastic rhetorical commitments to achieving a comprehensive agreement are matched by actual accomplishments on the ground**. A comprehensive, ambitious agreement will require the resolution of differences in dozens of areas. On some issues, bridging the divides should be fairly straightforward, though not necessarily easy. On others, success will require copious amounts of determination, ingenuity, and political will. Stakeholders will have to keep politicians and negotiators accountable to their goals and timetables. But too daunting an enterprise will render success elusive and cause negotiators to lose focus, interest, and, ultimately, the opportunity to achieve meaningful reforms. The TTIP negotiations must not be permitted to devolve into a decade-long, transatlantic cocktail party for negotiators, advisers, and lobbyists. In the interest of avoiding that fate, this paper suggests a procedural roadmap for managing the negotiations in an orderly, constructive, politically digestible manner. It recommends that Negotiators identify and announce a discrete set of specific, achievable goals with realistic deadlines; The negotiations over regulatory processes and regulatory standards be better defined and made more manageable by employing a “negative list” approach, where issues deemed “off limits” to negotiation are specified at the outset so that they do not obscure what is achievable; The negotiators abandon the single undertaking principle and, instead, aim to produce three successive biennial agreements by harvesting the lowest hanging fruit once every two years. Managing with forethought and determination a process that could otherwise descend into an intractable quagmire is essential to ensuring that negotiators deliver most of what they promise. Toward Greater Economic Integration The idea of a transatlantic trade agreement has been floating around for many years, dating back to the Marshall Plan. Certainly there are compelling rationales for such an agreement, including shared cultural ties, a common history of multilateral institution building, and similar commitments to democratic governance. Moreover, the U.S. and EU economies are already significantly integrated. Bilateral trade amounts to about $1 trillion per year and cross-border direct investment stocks total $3.7 trillion. Bilateral direct investment between the United States and European Union constitutes the most intertwined, cross-border investment relationship in the world. The combined economies account for $34 trillion in GDP (nearly half of the world’s output) and more than one-third of all global trade flows involve U.S. or EU entities. **Reducing barriers that raise the cost of transatlantic commerce would generate greater efficiencies and more scope for specialization and economies of scale, spawning economic growth and higher living standards**. But these aren’t new revelations. So, why, after all of these years of relationship-building, was TTIP formally launched in 2013? Why, after many years of knocking this idea around and concluding that the obstacles were too daunting, did policymakers decide those impediments surmountable? Transatlantic Agreement: Why Now? As great as the benefits may be, the TTIP was not borne of any genuine enthusiasm for the enterprise. In Europe, it was seen as a last resort. Frustrated by the failures of monetary policy and restricted by the imperative of fiscal austerity, policymakers were looking for something—anything—to embrace as a potential economic tonic. Whether they actually thought TTIP likely to bear fruit is an entirely different matter. They wanted something to behold as evidence that Greece did not represent Europe’s fate. Potential voter wrath, political backlash, and stalemate–historically effective deterrents to initiating transatlantic trade talks–took a back seat to the affirmative optics of embracing some plausible initiative that might steer Europe from the abyss. For U.S. policymakers, the main motivation for launching TTIP was to assuage EU concerns that the United States had written her off in its "pivot" to Asia. Other rationales for pursuing TTIP include the argument that the world needs the United States and European Union to reassert global economic leadership at a time when no other country or group of countries is willing or able to do so. Another is that there is a race to establish global production standards and TTIP, representing half the world’s output, presents an opportunity to establish them here and now. A third ex-post rationale is that by establishing disciplines on issues where other trade agreements are silent—issues like currency manipulation, the operations of state-owned enterprises, local content rules, and others—the United States and EU could establish rules that China and others would eventually have to heed. It is within this context that TTIP emerged. But none of those rationales–pursuing TTIP as a last resort, assuaging hurt feelings, establishing standards, disciplining China and others–seem likely to provide the motivation for negotiators and governments to dig deep and remain committed enough to make difficult choices that may carry political consequences. As the talks drag, will governments remain committed to the goals? Will governments motivated by the "last resort" rationale continue to invest seriously in the negotiations if their economies experience growth and the political costs of TTIP no longer look so necessary to incur? Already there have been signs of retreat from the ambitious goals articulated at the outset. Taking Small, Digestible Bites Is Key to TTIP Success From the outset, negotiators erred by setting a 2014 completion date for the negotiations. There is absolutely no plausibility to that deadline and, frankly, failure to amend the timetable with realistic deadlines will only undermine the credibility of the undertaking with a public already skeptical of trade negotiations. There are dozens of issues on the table of varying complexity that will likely take several years to resolve**. Rather than have a single deadline for a single undertaking, the negotiators should announce that their intention is to achieve a multi-tiered agreement that yields multiple harvests at established time intervals. Some analysts have referred to the TTIP as a "living agreement,"** although a common understanding of that concept is not evident nor, to my knowledge, have the governments or their negotiators used this characterization in any official context. They should. And it should work something like this. Negotiators would take stock of the issues on the table and rank them in order of importance to a successful TTIP conclusion. They would then rank those same issues in terms of order of difficulty to resolve. Based on averaging and some agreed upon weighting of those two sets of rankings, negotiators would identify what they and their counterparts see as the most important and least important issues, as well as the most difficult and least difficult issues to resolve. That exercise would produce a road map for how to proceed. In April the Atlantic Council and the Bertelsmann Foundation co-published an excellent paper that was based primarily on a survey of trade experts in the United States and Europe, who were asked to identify the likely TTIP issues and rank them from most important for a successful conclusion to least important.1 (See Figure 1.) They were then asked to rank those same issues from most to least difficult to resolve. The results were then plotted in a matrix with the level of importance tracked along the horizontal axis and the level of difficulty tracked along the vertical axis. The most populated area of the matrix is the upper right quadrant, which is where the issues that are most important and most difficult to achieve reside. The fact that 8 of the 17 issues identified fall into that quadrant reinforces the conclusion that a 2014 deadline for a comprehensive agreement is woefully unrealistic. Achieving regulatory process convergence was considered the most important and the second most difficult issue to resolve, just behind "Genetically Modified Organisms and Agriculture" in terms of difficulty. Tariff reduction and elimination was considered among the most important issues, but the easiest issue to resolve. Labor standards convergence was considered the least important issue likely to be on the table. But the greatest utility of this presentation of the issues is that it identifies the low-hanging fruit, and prioritizes those issues by importance. Everything below 3.5 on the vertical axis can be considered the low-hanging fruit. The "relatively" low-hanging fruit would be the 8 or 9 lowest issues on the vertical axis. Certainly, these issues are not exhaustive, nor are their positions on the matrix constant. Over time, and as events unfold, some of these issues will become more (or less) important and more (or less) difficult. For example, since the survey results reflected in this matrix were published, the NSA spying scandal came to light, rendering the "data protection/privacy" issue much more difficult to resolve than it would have been otherwise. Europeans are now far more skeptical that U.S. companies can guarantee the privacy of their information. That issue probably belongs much higher in the matrix now and, in fact, may be off the chart. Likewise, the issue of audio visual (A/V) quotas has been carved out from the negotiations at the behest of France. It may very likely be off the chart now or, at least, at a much higher vertical point than it was a few months ago. Other issues, such as transatlantic competition in the commercial aviation and shipping transportation industries did not even make the list, despite the enormous upside to reform in those heavily protected industries. Customizing the Matrix for the TTIP Negotiations The Atlantic Council/Bertelsmann Foundation matrix provides a useful analytical starting point for constructing a TTIP roadmap. The negotiators should begin by identifying the most important issues and ranking them according to difficulty. If the timetable for ultimate completion of the negotiations is to include three biennial harvests–one every two years–then the goal for each two-year tranche would be to reach agreement on 33 percent of the current issues by focusing on the easiest matters each time (harvesting the lowest hanging fruit). After reaching accord on the first tranche of issues and implementing the first phase of the agreement, negotiators would re-rank the remaining issues and identify the easiest 50 percent as the low-hanging fruit. After concluding the second tranche, they would implement and move to resolving the remaining issues (the most difficult by definition) in the final two-year negotiating tranche. The point of this approach is to improve chances for success. By breaking up the TTIP into more easily digestible pieces, negotiators are less likely to choke, and governments and stakeholders are more likely to stay engaged. What is needed for success is enthusiasm. What breeds enthusiasm are tastes of success. And tastes of success can come from setting and reaching goals in shorter increments, starting with agreement on the lowest hanging fruit first. Negative List Approach to Regulatory Issues To facilitate the process of identifying what matters to tackle in what order, the issues should be identified as specifically as possible. If they are too broadly specified, then the potential to identify low-hanging fruit will be obscured. That is precisely the problem afflicting the issues of regulatory standard convergence and regulatory process convergence, which are widely considered the source of TTIP’s greatest potential gains, as it is enormously costly whenever businesses have to meet different standards to participate in different markets. There seem to be vague and perhaps disparate understandings of what regulatory reform entails. Commentators have tended to refer to these issues monolithically. It would be conducive to break these issues up and separate what is on the table from what is not. This can be achieved through adoption of what negotiators call a "negative list" approach. A negative list includes all issues that negotiators identify as off limits to negotiation. Everything not on the list is on the table. Creating a negative list for regulatory issues will help negotiators, and the public, obtain a better sense of the contours of this otherwise amorphous blob of issues, revealing a more useful diagnosis of the regulatory incoherence problem. By placing issues off limits to the negotiations, it becomes clear what is on the table. And that will help negotiators identify the lower hanging fruit of regulatory reform. For all regulatory issues on the table, negotiators should default to a standard of mutual recognition. If that approach is for some reason untenable, then convergence toward a single standard should be the approach with the standard selected being the least intrusive or least costly approach and, if disagreement remains still, by attempting to divide the chosen standards equally between both sides. Recognizing that the U.S. standard of three-foot electrical cords on household appliances is equivalent to the EU standard of one meter (3’3") long cords in terms of ensuring consumer safety might be a sensible reform that reduces appliance production costs and lowers consumer prices. Mutually recognizing the equivalence of each other’s drug approval processes would eliminate logistical redundancies, saving industry excessive delays and billions of dollars, while reducing mortality and morbidity rates. There are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of similar regulatory processes and standards that could be bridged through such mutual recognition or convergence. **Other Crucial Issues to TTIP Success Establishing a formula to continuously drive the negotiations forward is a necessary, but by no means sufficient, condition of TTIP success. Obstacles abound. First, abandoning the "single undertaking" approach to trade negotiations will require convincing traditionalists wed to the idea that liberalization of barriers requires cross-sector trading of concessions.** Each negotiating tranche might require some customization to ensure that there are adequate trade-offs, where the U.S. and EU negotiators have a relatively equal number of offensive and defensive interests. Second, opponents will try to define the TTIP in a negative light. Some will cast harmonization of standards and mutual recognition of regulations as an effort by industry to pad its bottom line at the expense of public health and safety. Regulatory agencies will encourage these ad campaigns, as their power to make or break will be reduced by smart reform. Supporters will have to demonstrate how superfluous regulations do not make the public safer, but instead add unnecessary costs to production that are passed on to consumers and diminish the resources available to invest in economic activity and job creation. Compliance with regulations costs U.S. industry $1.75 trillion per year, which exceeds the annual value added of the entire U.S. manufacturing sector.2 Third, **what about Canada and Mexico, and even Turkey? The North American market is highly integrated in many industries with cross-border production and supply chains that send goods and services back and forth across the border on a daily basis.** A TTIP that does not include clear and reasonable accession provisions for Canada, Mexico, and Turkey (which is highly integrated with the EU) would be trade diverting and would represent an enormous opportunity cost. Fourth, comprehensive agreement will require green lights from both sides on numerous issues, but on issues concerning regulatory reform and government procurement, to name some, U.S. state-level and EU country-level officials also will have to be sufficiently satisfied with the deal for it to proceed. Issues pertaining to federalism and European state sovereignty make these sub-federal entities potentially obstructive players in the negotiations. Fifth, to complicate matters further, **there is widespread concern that a comprehensive TTIP agreement would be the death knell for the World Trade Organization**. If new rules are established by the world’s largest economies outside of the multilateral system, the WTO could descend into irrelevance. But some multilateral realists, who acknowledge that negotiating complex agreements with 160 member governments at disparate levels of economic development is no longer a viable option for liberalization, have argued that TTIP can "save" the WTO. By achieving concurrence on some very complicated 21st century issues, TTIP could blaze the path for the WTO by presenting some best practices, which could ultimately be multilateralized and adopted by the WTO. Such an objective should be kept in mind as the TTIP negotiations proceed so that its terms can be more easily multilateralized in the future. Conclusion Whether or not the TTIP produces an ambitious, comprehensive agreement will depend on numerous factors. Keeping negotiators focused on the task and governments continuously supportive of their efforts may be the most important requirement. Setting and achieving discrete goals with discrete deadlines—three smaller, successive agreements reached and implemented every two years by harvesting the lowest-hanging fruit first—offers a promising start. The process will require rejecting the single undertaking approach to negotiations, where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. To improve chances for success, it will also need to employ a negative list approach for regulatory issues so as to distill and identify what is and is not achievable.

### Euro

#### The aff can’t solve Italy and that crushes the Eurozone

Reuters 10/25 – Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/25/us-ecb-italy-asmussen-idUSBRE99O0UM20131025>

In a speech in Milan, Asmussen said the euro zone cannot prosper if [Italy](http://www.reuters.com/places/italy), the bloc's third-largest economy, is not growing. The Italian economy is mired in its longest post-war recession and has contracted for eight successive quarters.¶ "Italy is too big to be rescued from the outside, it has to make the turnaround on its own," Asmussen said in the text of a speech for delivery at Bocconi University in Milan, where he studied in 1991-92.¶ "Its fate will critically determine the fate of the euro area," he said. "In this sense, the future of the euro area will not be decided in Paris or Berlin, or in Frankfurt or Brussels. It will be decided in Rome."¶ Asmussen, a German who sits on the six-man Executive Board that forms the nucleus of the ECB's policymaking Governing Council, stressed that every country in the 17-member euro zone "has a responsibility to pull its weight".¶ "But because of my personal experiences in this country, I neither worry about the future of this country nor about the future of the euro area," he said.¶ Turning to the euro zone's banking union, Asmussen said credible national backstops must be put in place before the ECB concludes its health check of banks in October 2014.¶ "If not, the credibility of the whole exercise is put at risk as the outcome will then almost certainly be negatively perceived by market participants," he said.¶ "Doing this balance sheet assessment without a backstop in place would be a bit like getting on a boat in rough weather conditions, and not taking a life jacket on board."¶ The ECB promised on Wednesday to put top euro zone banks through rigorous tests next year, staking its credibility on a review that aims to build confidence in the sector.¶ The ECB still supported plans for a Single Resolution Mechanism to deal with troubled banks entering into force in January 2015, Asmussen said.¶ He also favored the harmonization of corporate tax codes, bases and rates in Europe.¶ "Ideally, such a strategy would involve all EU countries. But if this is not feasible, euro area countries could lead the way by deepening the fiscal union in this area," he said.

**No transition war-economic interdependence and empirics**

**Gartzke 9** \*Erik Gartzke is an associate professor of political science at UC San Diego [Gartzke Power Shuffle: Will the Coming Transition Be Peaceful? [Gartzke, Erik](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlink:lateralsearch/sng/author/Gartzke,+Erik/$N?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks). [Current History](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlinkbypubid:lateralsearch/sng/pubtitle/Current+History/$N/41559?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks)[108. 721](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.issuebrowselink:searchpublicationissue/41559/Current+History/02009Y11Y01$23Nov+2009$3b++Vol.+108+$28721$29/108/721?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks) (Nov 2009): 374-380]

THE BRITISH PRECEDENT There is precedent for a successful policy of engagement in hegemonic transition. At the dawn of the twentieth century, Great Britain found it could work with the nouveau riche United States. Unlike in preceding transitions, protagonists did not become antagonists because they had so much in common. The United States, late to the European-led game of imperial enterprise, quickly discovered that conquest did not pay. America, after fiascos in Cuba and the Philippines, was happy to be a commercial, rather than imperial, power. Britain, too, found that the promotion of free commerce served its interests. As the world's largest trading power, the United Kingdom benefited disproportionately from encouraging a system of reciprocal access to national and colonial markets. Market economics rapidly made control of territory much less important than access to consumers. Promoting the prosperity of dependent powers further weakened the appeal of colonial administration. Thus the United States was able to peacefully assume the mantle of hegemon because the two powers had developed compatible international objectives through a common system of global commerce. Under British hegemony, the United States had obtained much of what it wanted from the established world order, and it enjoyed the additional benefit of not having to pay the high price of policing a system that was largely acceptable. The United States could free-ride on British efforts to manage a market-based global economy. The British, meanwhile, respected the US sphere of influence in the Americas, while the United States had no interest in controlling traditional British spheres of influence in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia, as long as American manufacturers retained access to commercial markets in these regions. This system, though it included numerous colonial holdings, was not all that different from the one that the United States preferred and eventually sponsored. Indeed, the problem from an international perspective was that America was reluctant to inherit hegemony. The United States persisted as a largely demilitarized power until World War II, despite the fact that the United Kingdom's relative decline was taxing its ability to sustain the system from which the United States benefited. Only in the aftermath of World War II, when it became clear that Britain could no longer manage the global system, did the United States decide to run the world. More important than British decline, however, was the fact that the Soviet Union posed the chief alternative to American hegemony. Recognition of the increasing importance of global public goods to its own and other nations' prosperity, and cognizance of the consequences of a Soviet-led system, forced the United States to dramatically shift its foreign policy and assume the position of global leadership. It is tempting to conclude that the peaceful transition from British to US hegemony was the result of a common Anglo culture, or of unique characteristics of the United States as a nation. But Anglo amity had not prevented the American Revolution, nor had a common Anglo culture stopped the Union and the Confederacy from fighting the deadliest contest in US history. And while it is possible that American accession to hegemony was exceptional, one must hope this is not the case, given the inevitability that the United States will someday be replaced as hegemon. THE RISE OF THE REST For a time in the post-World War II period, it appeared that the Soviet Union might surpass the United States. In retrospect, those fears appear wildly misplaced, but they exemplify the power of uncertainty as a determinant of international affairs. Not knowing caused the United States to be more defensive than was perhaps necessary, while uncertainty supplied the Soviets with ammunition that made them more effective than if the truth had been fully known. World War III was avoided thanks to luck and caution, rather than averted as a product of power relations and system structure. For a time in the 1980s strategic thinkers contemplated a succession by Europe or Japan. Anglo culture, inci- dentally, cannot explain how the United States and other powers addressed debate over the prospect of these transi- tions. While there was consid- érable anxiety in the United States about commercial com- petition, there was never a serious suggestion that Japanese or European aspirations constituted a real threat to the security of the United States. Europe was at peace with itself, while the Japanese seemed more eager to copy the United States commercially than to eclipse it politically. Again, a power transition between the United States and its allies never came to pass, but it is exceedingly unlikely in any case that such a transition would have involved significant international violence. What emerged in the twentieth century, and what appears likely to persist in the twenty-first century, is the realization that commerce creates compatible interests among world powers. Other objectives remain in tension today; if substantial enough they could open up the opportunity for ambiguity, conflict, and possibly war. But a common commitment to global trade at least creates the basis for an important set of mutual or compatible interests among states. America's fear is that a successor hegemon, or a group of powers enjoying dominance over different regions, might be inimical to US interests. Such hegemons could alter or supplant the institutions and commercial, social, and political norms that have helped the United States govern a prosperous system and made America thrive as well. If hegemonic successors or competing coalitions are bound to want different things, then the United States may find that it prefers to resist the transition to a new configuration of power. If, in addition, the net effect of conflict is difficult to judge, then conflict itself will be more likely, since both sides in a dispute could expect that they might prevail in a fight. Fortunately, there is reason to believe that the interests of current and future rivals for global power may not be incompatible. As with the [Anglo-American](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7?accountid=465) transition, future power transitions may involve states that want very similar things from the international system. Changes in the global economy since the late twentieth century have made global governance more important, valuable, and relatively neutral in terms of political conflict. The developed world, the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China), and other developing countries all benefit from institutions that promote trade, finan- cial stability, and politi- cal consensus. The more that China, for example, becomes integrated into the global economic system, the more that its preferences will reflect objectives similar to those of the United States. Indeed, development has led to a world system in which most candidates for regional or global power have common or compatible interests. Whereas in the past, power reflected an inherent incompatibility with other nations, today power derives from the very interactions that make nations more similar. If there is a good prospect that the world will remain peaceful, it is because the power now needed to run the world comes from cooperation, not from military conflict.

#### Debt, Food, energy and water are all going to implode- turns the aff and devastates the economy

**MMS 13** [Money Morning Staff, “Expert Warns Debt Crisis Will Spark An Economic Collapse Worse Than 2008 (TZA, FAZ, GLD, SLV, SDS, FAS)” <http://etfdailynews.com/2013/01/23/expert-warns-debt-crisis-will-spark-an-economic-collapse-worse-than-2008-tza-faz-gld-slv-sds-fas/> Jan 23 2013]//BM

[Click on the short video above](http://moneymappress.com/pro/Pyramid0712MMR2YShort40.php?code=PPYRP109&n=PYRMMR2YEADMMP40) to see a sample. to see charts, facts, and details. One member of this team, Chris Martenson, a pathologist and former VP of a Fortune 300 company, explains their findings: “We found an identical pattern in our debt, total credit market, and money supply that guarantees they’re going to fail. This pattern is nearly the same as in any pyramid scheme, one that escalates exponentially fast before it collapses. Governments around the globe are chiefly responsible. “And what’s really disturbing about these findings is that the pattern isn’t limited to our economy. We found the same catastrophic pattern in our energy, food, and water systems as well.” According to Martenson: “These systems could all implode at the same time. Food, water, energy, money. Everything.” Another member of this team, Keith Fitz-Gerald, the president of the Fitz-Gerald Group, went on to explain their discoveries. “What this pattern represents is a [dangerous countdown clock](http://moneymappress.com/pro/Pyramid0712MMR2YShort40.php?code=PPYRP109&n=PYRMMR2YEADMMP40) that’s quickly approaching zero. And when it does, the resulting chaos is going to crush Americans,” Fitz-Gerald says. Dr. Kent Moors, an adviser to 16 world governments on energy issues as well as a member of two U.S. State Department tasks forces on energy also voiced concerns over what he and his colleagues uncovered. “Most frightening of all is how this exact same pattern keeps appearing in virtually every system critical to our society and way of life,” Dr. Moors stated. Caption: The work of this team garnered such attention, they were brought in front of the United Nations, U.K. Parliament, and numerous Fortune 500 companies to share much of their findings. Click the short video above to see a sample. “It’s a pattern that’s hard to see unless you understand the way a catastrophe like this gains traction,” Dr. Moors says. “At first, it’s almost impossible to perceive. Everything looks fine, just like in every pyramid scheme. Yet the insidious growth of the virus keeps doubling in size, over and over again – in shorter and shorter periods of time – until it hits unsustainable levels. And it collapses the system.” Martenson points to the U.S. total credit market debt as an example of this unnerving pattern. “For 30 years – from the 1940s through the 1970s – our total credit market debt was moderate and entirely reasonable,” he says. “But then in seven years, from 1970 to 1977, it quickly doubled. And then it doubled again in seven more years. Then five years to double a third time. And then it doubled two more times after that. “Where we were sitting at a total credit market debt that was 158% larger than our GDP in the early 1940s… By 2011 that figure was 357%.” Dr. Moors warns this type of [unsustainable road to collapse](http://moneymappress.com/pro/Pyramid0712MMR2YShort40.php?code=PPYRP109&n=PYRMMR2YEADMMP40) can be seen today in our energy, food and water production. All are tightly connected and contributing to the economic disaster that lies directly ahead. According to polls, the average American is sensing danger. A recent survey found that 61% of Americans believe a catastrophe is looming – yet only 15% feel prepared for such a deeply troubling event. [Get A Free Trend Analysis For Any Stock Shares Here!](http://quotes.ino.com/analysis/trend/affiliates/?a_aid=CD3765&a_bid=7f00554c) Fitz-Gerald says people should take steps to protect themselves from what is happening. “The amount of risky financial derivatives floating around the globe is as much as 20 times size of the entire GDP of the world,” he says. “It’s unsustainable and impossible to unwind in any kind of orderly way.” Moreover, he adds: “People can also forget that the FDIC can only cover a fraction of US bank deposits. It’s a false sense of security. Just like state pensions, which could be suspended at any time. A collapse could wipe out these programs. Entitlements like Social Security and Medicare are already bankrupt and simply being propped up.” We can see the strain on society already. In two years, Congress won’t have any money for transportation, reports the Washington Post. Cities like Trenton, NJ have layed off one-third of the police force due to budget cuts. And other cities like Colorado Springs, CO removed one-third of streetlights, trashcans, and bus routes, reports CNN. Fitz-Gerald also warns of a period of devastating inflation. A recent survey, reports USA Today, notes that in the coming years it could take $150,000 a year in household income for a family to afford basic living expenses – and maybe go out to a movie. Right now, in fact, “52% of Americans feel they barely have enough to afford the basics.” “If our research is right,” says Fitz-Gerald, “Americans will have to make some tough choices on how they’ll go about surviving when basic necessities become nearly unaffordable and the economy becomes dangerously unstable.” “People need to begin to make preparations with their investments, retirement savings, and personal finances before it’s too late.” says Fitz-Gerald. Related: Direxion Daily Financial Bear 3X Shares ETF (NYSEARCA:FAZ), SPDR Gold Trust (NYSEARCA:GLD), iShares Silver Trust (NYSEARCA:SLV), Direxion Daily Small Cap Bear 3X Shares ETF (NYSEARCA:TZA), ProShares UltraShort S&P500 (NYSEARCA:SDS), Direxion Daily Financial Bull 3X Shares ETF (NYSEARCA:FAS).

### -- Alt Causes

**Solar energy protectionism screws over trade**

Tucker 8/27/12, William, work has appeared in Harper’s, the Atlantic Monthly, the American Spectator, the Weekly Standard, National Review, Reason, the New Republic, Reader’s Digest, the Wall Street Journal, and many other publications, "Let’s Just Admit Solar Needs Help and Avoid Trade War", http://www.nucleartownhall.com/blog/william-tucker-let%E2%80%99s-just-admit-solar-needs-help-and-avoid-trade-war/-http://www.nucleartownhall.com/blog/william-tucker-let%E2%80%99s-just-admit-solar-needs-help-and-avoid-trade-war/

Although the newspapers haven’t been paying much attention lately, the United States and China seem to be on the verge of a trade war that could have huge implications for the world economy. Let’s not scoff at trade wars. Although they’re easy to initiate, they’re awfully difficult to halt once they get started. People still remember the Stock Market Crash of 1929 as the start of the Great Depression but a couple of years ago, the late Bob Bartley, the great editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal, ran a series of columns showing clearly that it was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill of 1930 that turned what might have been just a cyclical downturn into a decade-long horror. How did Smoot-Hawley get started? A couple of Western Congressman wanted to protect the agricultural crops in their home states. President Herbert Hoover called a special session of Congress and before anybody knew it, every Senator and Representative from every state in the union had added something to the Christmas tree. The stock market nosedived, knowing where all this was leading, and before it was over the Great Depression had begun. Every economist in the world knows right now that we are teetering on the edge of such another conflagration. The world economy is in a slump and threatening to get worse. Japan has been in the doldrums for twenty years. Europe is suffering a meltdown. The U.S. is in a four-year funk. China and India have been the locomotive of the world economy but now China is showing serious signs of slowing down. Will everybody stay calm and try to ride out the storm? Or will the recriminations begin and countries start rocking the boat so that the whole world economy may go under? Well, the rocking has already begun and the boat is being tipped by – wouldn’t you know it – good old solar energy. Ah yes, solar energy, the wave of the future that is sure to arrive soon except that it’s still not economical and so our government has to subsidize it right now because it’s eventually going to be the wave of the future and then we’ll become the solar capital of the world. What government hasn’t fallen for that line? Europe has been practicing “feed-in tariffs” – which is just a fancy name for price supports – for more than a decade. Spain almost bankrupted itself trying to nurture an infant solar industry. Germany thinks it’s going to get rid of nuclear power and run itself on that country’s notoriously weak sunshine. Portugal, Italy, Greece – they all think exporting solar panels will be the cure for their ailing economies. Here in the United States, of course, we have the Production Tax Credit, Renewable Portfolio Mandates, government loan guarantees (a la Solyndra) and all sorts of other gimmicks for trying to promote solar. President Obama recently decided to utilize about 100 square miles of the Mojave Desert for a great solar experiment because “We Can’t Wait” for the market to tell us that solar is practical. And in China? Well, everything in China is pretty much run by the government, so you can imagine how much the industry is being supported there. And so the first shots have been fired. Six months ago President Obama yielded to the solar industry and placed a 31 percent tariff on solar panels from China. The charge was that China was “overproducing” and “dumping” panels on the US. China immediately retaliated by pointing out the many solar subsidies in this country and filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization saying we are dumping polysilicon on them. China too has its domestic industries that want protection. Now Europe has joined the fray. Germany thought by guaranteeing a high price to vendors of solar electricity that it would be fostering a domestic industry. Instead, it found it was subsidizing China. So they have cried “foul” and enlisted 24 other European manufacturers to file their own complaint with the European Trade Commission. Europe now constitutes 60 percent of China’s market and the consequences could be devastating. To top it off, India is now getting into the fray. So there we have it. The pieces are all in place for an international brawl that could bring down the world economy. Once the barricades have been erected for solar manufacturers, how long will it be before other industries ask for protection as well? Congressmen Smoot and Hawley must be celebrating in their graves. What a wonderful legacy this will make for good old clean-and-green solar power.

### -- No Impact

**No trade impact**

Fletcher 11 Ian Fletcher is Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, former Research Fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council M.A. and B.A. from Columbia and U Chicago, "Avoid Trade War? We're Already In One!" August 29 2011 www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/avoid-trade-war-were-alre\_b\_939967.html

The curious thing about the concept of trade war is that, unlike actual shooting war, it has no historical precedent. In fact, there has never been a significant trade war, "significant" in the sense of having done serious economic damage. All history records are minor skirmishes at best.¶ Go ahead. Try and name a trade war. The Great Trade War of 1834? Nope. The Great Trade War of 1921? Nope Again. There isn't one.¶ The standard example free traders give is that America's Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 either caused the Great Depression or made it spread around the world. But this canard does not survive serious examination, and has actually been denied by almost every economist who has actually researched the question in depth -- a group ranging from Paul Krugman on the left to Milton Friedman on the right.¶ The Depression's cause was monetary. The Fed allowed the money supply to balloon during the late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble. It then panicked, miscalculated, and let it collapse by a third by 1933, depriving the economy of the liquidity it needed to breathe. Trade had nothing to do with it.¶ As for the charge that Smoot caused the Depression to spread worldwide: it was too small a change to have plausibly so large an effect. For a start, it only applied to about one-third of America's trade: about 1.3 percent of our GDP. Our average tariff on dutiable goods went from 44.6 to 53.2 percent -- not a terribly big jump. Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914. Our tariff went up in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions, and the recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to spread worldwide without tariff increases.¶ As the economic historian (and free trader!) William Bernstein puts it in his book A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World,¶ Between 1929 and 1932, real GDP fell 17 percent worldwide, and by 26 percent in the United States, but most economic historians now believe that only a miniscule part of that huge loss of both world GDP and the United States' GDP can be ascribed to the tariff wars. .. At the time of Smoot-Hawley's passage, trade volume accounted for only about 9 percent of world economic output. Had all international trade been eliminated, and had no domestic use for the previously exported goods been found, world GDP would have fallen by the same amount -- 9 percent. Between 1930 and 1933, worldwide trade volume fell off by one-third to one-half. Depending on how the falloff is measured, this computes to 3 to 5 percent of world GDP, and these losses were partially made up by more expensive domestic goods. Thus, the damage done could not possibly have exceeded 1 or 2 percent of world GDP -- nowhere near the 17 percent falloff seen during the Great Depression... The inescapable conclusion: contrary to public perception, Smoot-Hawley did not cause, or even significantly deepen, the Great Depression.¶ The oft-bandied idea that Smoot-Hawley started a global trade war of endless cycles of tit-for-tat retaliation is also mythical. According to the official State Department report on this very question in 1931:¶ With the exception of discriminations in France, the extent of discrimination against American commerce is very slight...By far the largest number of countries do not discriminate against the commerce of the United States in any way.¶ That is to say, foreign nations did indeed raise their tariffs after the passage of Smoot, but this was a broad-brush response to the Depression itself, aimed at all other foreign nations without distinction, not a retaliation against the U.S. for its own tariff. The doom-loop of spiraling tit-for-tat retaliation between trading partners that paralyzes free traders with fear today simply did not happen.¶ "Notorious" Smoot-Hawley is a deliberately fabricated myth, plain and simple. We should not allow this myth to paralyze our policy-making in the present day.¶ There is a basic unresolved paradox at the bottom of the very concept of trade war. If, as free traders insist, free trade is beneficial whether or not one's trading partners reciprocate, then why would any rational nation start one, no matter how provoked? The only way to explain this is to assume that major national governments like the Chinese and the U.S. -- governments which, whatever bad things they may have done, have managed to hold nuclear weapons for decades without nuking each other over trivial spats -- are not players of realpolitik, but schoolchildren.¶ When the moneymen in Beijing, Tokyo, Berlin, and the other nations currently running trade surpluses against the U.S. start to ponder the financial realpolitik of exaggerated retaliation against the U.S. for any measures we may employ to bring our trade back into balance, they will discover the advantage is with us, not them. Because they are the ones with trade surpluses to lose, not us.¶ So our present position of weakness is, paradoxically, actually a position of strength.¶ Likewise, China can supposedly suddenly stop buying our Treasury Debt if we rock the boat. But this would immediately reduce the value of the trillion or so they already hold -- not to mention destroying, by making their hostility overt, the fragile (and desperately-tended) delusion in the U.S. that America and China are still benign economic "partners" in a win-win economic relationship.¶ At the end of the day, China cannot force us to do anything economically that we don't choose to. America is still a nuclear power. We can -- an irresponsible but not impossible scenario -- repudiate our debt to them (or stop paying the interest) as the ultimate counter-move to anything they might contemplate. More plausibly, we might simply restore the tax on the interest on foreign-held bonds that was repealed in 1984 thanks to Treasury Secretary Donald Regan.¶ Thus a certain amount of back-and-forth token retaliation (and loud squealing) is indeed likely if America starts defending its interests in trade as diligently as our trading partners have been defending theirs, but that's it. The rest of the world engages in these struggles all the time without doing much harm; it will be no different if we join the party.

## 1NR

### Overview

#### They have not sufficiently answered our autocratic peace argument. Democracies are prone to fragmentation and escalatory disagreements which means their brand of international stability is fundamentally untenable. Autocracies are a little bit coercive and probably don’t run their countries in the most ethical fashion, but they band together and do what it takes to keep tensions from escalating – that’s Gartzke and Weisiger. Prefer our evidence – your skepticism is explained by an epistemology that is pre-determined to prefer democratic systems – the best statistics prove our argument.

#### Now, more evidence – autocracy is an insurmountable firewall against conflict because wars are expensive, they threaten autocratic control, risks coups, detracts from domestic priorities and leaders don’t want dissent.

Rosato ‘11

[Asst Prof Poli Sci at Notre Dame and Univ of Chicago. *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, 2011]

There is also little evidence for Ihe other implication of the group constraint claim, namely that group constraints must be weaker in autocracies than in democracies. If the mechanism is to explain why democracies remain at peace but autocracies do not, then there must be good evidence that democratic leaders face greater group constraints. The evidence suggests, however, that autocratic leaders often respond to groups - themselves or their supporters that have powerful incentives to avoid war. One reason for autocrats to shy away from conflict is that wars are expensive and the best way to pay for them is to move to a system of consensual taxation, which in turn requires the expansion of the franchise. In other words, autocratic leaders have a powerful incentive to avoid wars lest they trigger political changes that may destroy their hold on power. Another reason to avoid war is that it allows civilian autocrats to maintain weak military establishments, thereby reducing the chances that they will be overthrown. Different considerations inhibit the war proneness of military dictators. First, because they must often devote considerable effort to domestic repression, they have fewer resources available for prosecuting foreign wars. Second, because they are used for repression their militaries often have little societal support, which makes them ill equipped to fight external wars. Third, military dictators are closely identified with the military and will therefore be cautious about waging war for fear that they will be blamed for any subsequent defeat. Finally, time spent fighting abroad is time away from other tasks on which a dictator's domestic tenure also depends. Thus there may be fewer groups with access to the foreign policy process in autocracies - in extreme cases only the autocrat himself has a say - but these often have a vested interest in avoiding war. This being the case, it is not clear that group constraints are weaker in autocracies than they are in democracies

#### Autocracies are more accountable and highly risk averse—studies prove they won’t go to war because the cost of losing is *too high*

Rosato ‘11

[Asst Prof Poli Sci at Notre Dame and Univ of Chicago. *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, 2011]

In assessing whether leaders are accountable, proponents of the democratic peace focus exclusively on their chances of losing office as a result of waging a losing or costly war (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, p. 794). Logically, however, accountability depends on a leader's likelihood of removal and the costs that he or she will incur when removed. It is not clear, for example, that leaders who are likely to be voted out of office for prosecuting a losing or costly war, but arc unlikely to be exiled, imprisoned or killed in the process will feel more accountable than leaders who are unlikely lo lose office, but can expect severe punishment in the unlikely event that they are in fact removed. Put somewhat differently, it is not clear that their expected costs, which are a function of the likelihood that they will be removed and the costs they will incur if they are removed, are substantially different.20¶ If we focus on expected costs, democrats do not appear to be more accountable than autocrats. An analysis of the fate of all leaders in all the wars in the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, reveals that democratic leaders who lose a war or embroil their state in a costly war arc marginally more likely to be removed from office than their autocratic counterparts (37 percent to 35 percent), but considerably less likely to be exiled, imprisoned, or killed (5 percent to 28 percent).21 ¶ Thus there is little evidence that democratic leaders face greater expected costs for waging losing or costly wars and are therefore more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans reach a similar conclusion in their examination of how defeat in war affects the tenure of democratic and nondemocratic leaders between 1919 and 1999. Defeat in war does not significantly affect the tenure of democrats, but does significantly reduce the tenure of autocrats (Chiozza and Goemans 2004, p. 613). Similarly, in her analysis of domestic audience costs, Jessica Weeks (2008, p. 59) finds that leaders in most nondemocracies are just as accountable as their democratic counterparts.

#### Democracy tanks primacy because it allows public sentiments to discourage military action

Zambelis ‘5

Chris Zambelis, policy analyst, Strategic Assessment Center, Hicks and Associates, Inc., “The Strategic Implications of Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Middle East,” PARAMETERS, Autumn 2005, pp. 87-102. Available from the World Wide Web at: [www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05autumn/zambelis.htm](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05autumn/zambelis.htm), accessed 3/9/06.

Given the populist credentials of Islamists, the rise of Islamist governments may transform the political and foreign policy orientation of traditional allies. This possibility should be of concern considering the credibility problem Washington faces in the region. As mentioned earlier, public opinion surveys demonstrate that America’s poor credibility does not stem from a popular Arab and Muslim aversion to American culture and democracy. Instead, Muslims harbor deep resentments toward US foreign policy in the region.40 Since democratic governments are by definition accountable to their citizens, public opinion will play an increasingly influential role in the political and foreign policy orientation of countries where Islamists dominate. When Islamists come to power, they will likely act on their populist impulses, at least in the early stages of any transition.41 For example, incumbent governments may place conditions on the continued presence of American military forces on their soil, but still keep dialogue open. Others may limit cooperation or abandon agreements governing security collaboration with Washington. It is also possible that democratic governments will cater to public opinion and demand that American forces vacate military installations altogether. It is no surprise that the new Shia-dominated Iraq has hinted at the need for establishing a timetable for the withdrawal of Coalition forces. Other governments may reorient their foreign policies away from the United States and look to Europe, Russia, and even China or India. China has been active in cultivating closer ties to prominent energy producers in the region, namely Sudan and Iran, in order to secure energy sources to fuel its dynamic economic growth.42 Beijing also has boosted security cooperation with Pakistan.43 India is pursuing a similar strategy in the region.44

#### Democracy crushes trade and overall growth

Garten ‘4

[Jeffrey. Dean of the Yale School of Management. “The Trouble With Freedom” *Newsweek*, May 2004 ln]

The growth of democracy could, for example, slow the expansion of international trade. Reason: a democratic government cannot decree the dropping of barriers but must listen to the views of farmers, workers, manufacturers, nongovernmental organizations and others. In many countries, the voice of public opinion will play a larger role than ever before. At best, this is likely to delay international trade talks as governments attempt to reach delicate compromises among competing interests at home. At worst, it could lead to rising protectionism as anti-trade groups scream the loudest. Democracies also tend to favor easy money, even when it's not the technically correct prescription for sound economic policies; it's a sure way for politicians to curry favor with the masses. The danger is that when several countries do this, the world economy develops a bias toward inflation--which ultimately is destructive to long-term growth. It is therefore vital to establish fiercely independent central banks with governors strong enough to withstand political pressure. Right now, for example, the finance ministers from Germany and France are in a highly visible f¶ ight with Jean-Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank, over his insistence that now is not the right time to lower interest rates in the eurozone. This kind of confrontation is sure to be played out in many countries over the next few years. Speaking of easy money, democracies like to open the spending spigot, even when they shouldn't. Case in point: Brazil's president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, is right now under intense public pressure to abandon his admirable fiscal conservatism in order to gun the economic engines. The temptation may be politically irresistible and even understandable, but international financial markets will not be pleased. Even the most advanced democracies, such as the United States, France and Germany, have demonstrated an inability to build the necessary long-term safety nets to prosper in a hypercompetitive global economy. Obviously, so too will less sophisticated democracies. Think about America's inability to rein in its enormous fiscal deficits, despite the certainty of massive upcoming expenses relating to Social Security and health care for its aging population. Or about the inability of major European nations to establish economically viable pension and unemployment compensation systems.

### Backsliding

#### Democracy is decreasing now globally—2/3 of all breakdowns of democracy since 1974 have occurred in the last 9 years and many countries are in a twilight zone where they’re likely to fall back to autocracy becase of the insability of democracy in those markets—that’s Diamond

#### They’re right that our evidence cites specific regions—he does that in order to prove that democracy globally is decreasing overall

#### Evaluate the link first – tons of democratic transitions in the status quo – could go either way

Suto ‘11

[Ryan Suto is a Research Associate at Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, has degrees in degrees in law, post-conflict reconstruction, international relations and public relations from Syracuse Law, “Judicial Diplomacy: The International Impact of the Supreme Court”, 07/15/11, http://jurist.org/dateline/2011/07/ryan-suto-judicial-diplomacy.php]

The Court is certainly the best institution to explain to scholars, governments, lawyers and lay people alike the enduring legal values of the US, why they have been chosen and how they contribute to the development of a stable and democratic society. A return to the mentality that one of America's most important exports is its legal traditions would certainly benefit the US and stands to benefit nations building and developing their own legal traditions, and our relations with them. Furthermore, it stands to increase the influence and higher the profile of the bench. The Court already engages in the exercise of dispensing justice and interpreting the Constitution, and to deliver its opinions with an eye toward their diplomatic value would take only minimal effort and has the potential for high returns. While the Court is indeed the best body to conduct legal diplomacy, it has been falling short in doing so in recent sessions. We are at a critical moment in world history. People in the Middle East and North Africa are asserting discontent with their governments. Many nations in Africa, Asia, and Eurasia are grappling with new technologies, repressive regimes and economic despair. With the development of new countries, such as South Sudan, the formation of new governments, as is occurring in Egypt, and the development of new constitutions, as is occurring in Nepal, it is important that the US welcome and engage in legal diplomacy and informative two-way dialogue. As a nation with lasting and sustainable legal values and traditions, the Supreme Court should be at the forefront of public legal diplomacy. With each decision, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to better define, explain and defend key legal concepts. This is an opportunity that should not be wasted.

### Link

#### US-Mexico relations are vital to democracy – Mexico is the acid test for the legitimacy of the American model; every emergent democracy will perceive the signal of the plan – that’s O’Neil

#### More evidence – improved relations are a vehicle for democracy

Hakim ‘6

[Peter Hakim, President of InterAmerican Dialogue. “Is Washington Losing Latin America?”. Foreign Affairs 85 no1 39-53 Ja/F 2006. Wiley Online.]

Even more troubling to U.S. officials has been the evolving political situation. Washington likes to tout Latin America as a showcase for democracy. Democratic politics are still the norm in the region; only Cuba remains under authoritarian rule. But in the past decade, nearly a dozen elected presidents have been forced from office, many by street protests or mob violence. Despite holding elections and plebiscites, Venezuela today barely qualifies as a democracy. The same is true of Haiti, which more and more is coming to resemble a failed state. In Bolivia and Ecuador, fractious politics are reinforced by deep social, ethnic, and regional divisions. In Nicaragua, an alliance of corrupt legislators from the left and the right has so paralyzed the government that next year's presidential election may restore to power Washington's nemesis Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega. And these are not the only countries in the region where democracy is under stress and could deteriorate quickly. Although a majority of Latin American citizens still consider democracy to be the best form of government, most hold a low opinion of their government and leaders. In many places, the performance of public institutions, tainted by corruption, has been lackluster. Judicial systems in the region are mostly slow moving and unfair. Legislatures operate erratically. Political parties are weaker and less representative than ever. Only a few Latin American countries, most prominently Chile, have bucked the region's discouraging trends and made progress in consolidating democratic politics.

#### Yes spillover

Rakner et al., 2007

(Lise Rakner (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Alina Rocha Menocal (ODI) and¶ Verena Fritz (ODI), “Democratisation’s Third Wave and the Challenges of¶ Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy¶ Assistance and Lessons Learned”, Good Governance, Aid Modalities and Poverty¶ Reduction, 08/2007, http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/241.pdf)

Aside from deliberate conditionality, another important international force is so-called ‘snowballing’¶ – i.e. the effects of diffusion (Huntington, 1991). As demonstrated in Eastern Europe and Latin¶ America, transitions to democracy often trigger subsequent transitions in other countries within the¶ same region. This is one reason for the perception that regional organisations such as the African¶ Union (AU) and the Organisation of American States (OAS) sometimes offer the potential to act as¶ catalysts of positive change and transformation. In the particular case of Africa, the New¶ Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), formally adopted in July 2001 by African heads of¶ state, is now widely seen as the continent’s main official development framework. Among other¶ things, the Partnership states that Africa’s development ‘is impossible in the absence of true¶ democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance’. It commits African leaders to¶ promoting these principles in their own countries and regionally. In this context, the Africa Peer¶ Review Mechanism (APRM) has been created as an initiative to use peer pressure and¶ demonstration effects to assess progress and performance among participating countries towards¶ achieving agreed goals in areas such as democracy and political governance.¶ The APRM is an African self-monitoring mechanism voluntarily acceded to by member states of¶ the African Union. Its purpose is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states¶ conform to agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards, and¶ promote political stability, economic growth, sustainable development and regional economic¶ integration. The APR monitoring process takes place through periodic peer review to analyse and¶ assess progress and performance among participating countries towards achieving mutually¶ agreed goals in the areas of Democracy and Political Governance, Economic Governance and¶ Management, Corporate Governance and Socio-economic Development. The process also entails¶ sharing experiences and identifying and promoting good and best practices, as well as undertaking¶ interventions to build capacity. The APRM itself is intended to be reviewed every five years.¶ The APRM is pioneering because it is the first such self-monitoring mechanism to emerge from the¶ region to promote some form of mutual accountability among African governments. As a result, it¶ enjoys a high degree of legitimacy among the African states that have so far chosen to take part in¶ it. The idea is to allow African states to evaluate their peers in a manner that will collectively raise¶ the bar on governance standards and performance. As of July 2006, 25 countries had formally¶ signed up to the APRM. However, because it is purely voluntary in nature and lacks any formal¶ enforceability mechanisms, its success rests on the level of commitment in participating countries¶ and the effectiveness with which they manage the process. On the other hand, there is recognition¶ among donors that, because of its legitimacy among African states, the APRM represents the best¶ institutional alternative available at the international level for engaging with Africa and, as such, it is¶ essential to work with it. Thus far, the APRM has passed its first test cases involving Ghana,¶ Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa, with the expectation that there will be more. It is also important¶ to note that, because the initiative is still in its early years, the literature on the subject remains¶ limited.¶ Notwithstanding the general importance of external impulses, most academic experts emphasise¶ that the commitment of a critical number of key domestic political actors is instrumental in making¶ transitions to democracy possible. Regional frameworks like the OAS or NEPAD can at best exert¶ pressure, but their pronouncements and resolutions lack authority and they cannot be enforced in¶ any binding way. From what can be gleaned from the diversity of experiences within the Third¶ Wave of democratisation in Latin America, Africa and Asia, it seems that internal political will is a¶ necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for democratic transition. As the case of Iraq¶ demonstrates, efforts to institute democracy by force from the outside without sufficient support¶ from within are bound to be extremely challenging and unsustainable, and, to put it mildly, their¶ success cannot be guaranteed. On the other hand, external factors can play a significant role in¶ shaping the preferences and relative bargaining positions of key domestic actors. In this way, they¶ can be very influential and, in certain cases, even critical in terms of accompanying/¶ complementing/strengthening domestic forces committed to democratic change. As Burnell puts it¶ (2001a: 5), ‘generally speaking democracy assistance is neither a necessary nor a sufficient¶ condition for a democratic opening or for building democracy, although it could come close to being¶ essential in some countries … Outsiders lend support to a process that is locally driven.’¶

### a/t: diamond

#### the diamond 95 evidence? Really?

#### DPT’s wrong – democracies are more inclined to cause conflict and autocracies are more likely to maintain the peace. Gartzke and Weisinger say that autocracies are best at maintaining peace – there’s gotta be a steady hand to rock the cradle. Prefer our evidence – it indicts all democratic peace theorists and says there is *no statistical support* for the claim that democracies are unlikely to go to war.

#### Democracy doesn’t cause peace – statistical models are spurious and don’t assume economic growth

Mousseau, 12

(Michael – Professor IR Koç University, “The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy” International Studies Quarterly, p 1-12)

Model 2 presents new knowledge by adding the control for economic type. To capture the dyadic expectation of peace among contract-intensive nations, the variable Contract- intensive EconomyL (CIEL) indicates the value of impersonal contracts in force per capita of the state with the lower level of CIE in the dyad; a high value of this measure indicates both states have contract-intensive economies. As can be seen, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.80) is negative and highly significant. This corroborates that impersonal economy is a highly robust force for peace. The coefficient for DemocracyL is now at zero. There are no other differences between Models 1 and 2, whose samples are identical, and no prior study corroborating the democratic peace has considered contractintensive economy. Therefore, the standard econometric inference to be drawn from Model 2 is the nontrivial result that all prior reports of democracy as a force for peace are probably spurious, since this result is predicted and fully accounted for by economic norms theory. CIEL and DemocracyL correlate only in the moderate range of 0.47 (Pearson’s r), so the insignificance of democracy is not likely to be a statistical artifact of multicollinearity. This is corroborated by the variance inflation factor for DemocracyL in Model 2 of 1.85, which is well below the usual rule-of-thumb indicator of multicollinearity of 10 or more. Nor should readers assume most democratic dyads have both states with impersonal economies: While almost all nations with contract-intensive economies (as indicated with the binary measure for CIE) are democratic (Polity2 > 6) (Singapore is the only long-term exception), more than half—55%—of all democratic nation-years have contract-poor economies. At the dyadic level in this sample, this translates to 80% of democratic dyads (all dyads where DemocracyBinary6 = 1) that have at least one state with a contract-poor economy. In other words, not only does Model 2 show no evidence of causation from democracy to peace (as reported in Mousseau 2009), but it also illustrates that this absence of democratic peace includes the vast majority—80%—of democratic dyad-years over the sample period. Nor is it likely that the causal arrow is reversed—with democracy being the ultimate cause of contract-intensive economy and peace. This is because correlations among independent variables are not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: Coefficients show only the effect of each variable after the potential effects of the others are kept constant at their mean levels. If it was democracy that caused both impersonal economy and peace, then there would be some variance in DemocracyL remaining, after its partial correlation with CIEL is excluded, that links it directly with peace. The positive direction of the coefficient for DemocracyL informs us that no such direct effect exists (Blalock 1979:473–474). Model 3 tests for the effect of DemocracyL if a control is added for mixed-polity dyads, as suggested by Russett (2010:201). As discussed above, to avoid problems of mathematical endogeneity, I adopt the solution used by Mousseau, Orsun and Ungerer (2013) and measure regime difference as proposed by Werner (2000), drawing on the subcomponents of the Polity2 regime measure. As can be seen, the coefficient for Political Distance (1.00) is positive and significant, corroborating that regime mixed dyads do indeed have more militarized conflict than others. Yet, the inclusion of this term has no effect on the results that concern us here: CIEL ()0.85) is now even more robust, and the coefficient for DemocracyL (0.03) is above zero.7 Model 4 replaces the continuous democracy measure with the standard binary one (Polity2 > 6), as suggested by Russett (2010:201), citing Bayer and Bernhard (2010). As can be observed, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.83) remains negative and highly significant, while DemocracyBinary6 (0.63) is in the positive (wrong) direction. As discussed above, analyses of fatal dispute onsets with the far stricter binary measure for democracy (Polity = 10), put forward by Dafoe (2011) in response to Mousseau (2009), yields perfect prediction (as does the prior binary measure Both States CIE), causing quasi-complete separation and inconclusive results. Therefore, Model 5 reports the results with DemocracyBinary10 in analyses of all militarized conflicts, not just fatal ones. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyBinary10 ()0.41), while negative, is not significant. Model 6 reports the results in analyses of fatal disputes with DemocracyL squared (after adding 10), which implies that the likelihood of conflict decreases more quickly toward the high values of DemocracyL. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyL 2 is at zero, further corroborating that even very high levels of democracy do not appear to cause peace in analyses of fatal disputes, once consideration is given to contractintensive economy. Models 3, 4, and 6, which include Political Distance, were repeated (but unreported to save space) with analyses of all militarized interstate disputes, with the democracy coefficients close to zero in every case. Therefore, the conclusions reached by Mousseau (2009) are corroborated even with the most stringent measures of democracy, consideration of institutional distance, and across all specifications: The democratic peace appears spurious, with contract-intensive economy being the more likely explanation for both democracy and the democratic peace.

#### The obvious argument that everyone makes is that no two democracies have ever gone to war—that may be true—but Dasse

#### Democracy destroys the environment

Midlarsky ‘98

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Yet one wonders if all of the preceding arguments do not constitute an idealization of democracy that ignores the rough and tumble of actual decision-making within the legislative and executive branches of government. Corporations and environmental groups can fight each other to a standstill, leaving a decision-making vacuum instead of a direct impact of democracy on the environment. Or as the result of budget constraints, democracies may not be responsive to environmental imperatives but to more pressing issues of the economic sustenance of major portions of the voting public. The nuts and bolts of daily democratic governance may turn out to be very different from the ideal. There are further difficulties in the hypothesized positive relationship between democracy and the environment. First is the problem of potential inequality, always a difficulty in practising democracy in the absence of draconian redistribution schemes. According to Lafferty & Meadowcroft (1996b): Environmental problems are typically experienced as external constraints which frustrate established expectations and which require an adjustment to existing social practices. They threaten a pre-existing structure of entitlements and raise questions concerning distributive justice. While the idea that a cleaner environment will benefit everyone that green policies are good for both rich and poor, industrialists and consumers - is attractive, in reality environmental problems touch dijferent groups in diffrerent ways As intimated earlier, stable democracies cannot long persist under conditions of extreme inequality. A second concern is the difficulty presented by the globalization of environmental issues. As Paehlke (1996: 28) put it, 'The great danger for both democracy and environment is that, while economy and environment are now global in character, democracy functions on only national and local decision levels and only within some nations.' The problems imposed by the Chernobyl disaster of course constitute an illustration in extremis. But even between democracies there are difficulties imposed by the sharing of a common environment. The acidification of Scandinavian lakes as the result of British industry is but one case in point. Despite the existence of two democratically elected governments accountable to their separate populations, the resolution of such environmental problems between the two countries requires negotiation and treaty making that would not necessarily be accountable to these populations.